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L. Introduction
The state corporate income tax system is broken, and only Congress
can fix it. The current state of affairs is problematic for states,' burdensome
for multistate corporations,2 and unfair to smaller, local businesses.3 States
are unable to resolve these problems themselves; federal intervention is the
only solution.
Two major defects plague the current system. The first is the lack of a
clear national standard for state income tax jurisdiction.4 The second is the
lack of a uniform method for apportioning the income of multistate
businesses for tax purposes.5 These defects combine to create a number of
serious problems.
Multistate businesses are subjected to onerous
compliance burdens and significant tax uncertainty, as well as the risk of
taxation on more than 100% of their income.7 States suffer as substantial
amounts of income fall through jurisdictional cracks, resulting in "nowhere
income" that is untaxed by any state.8 Moreover, the tax revenue that is
collected is not distributed equitably among the states in which the income
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Infra Part 1l.
Infra note 261 and accompanying text.
Infra Part VI.A.
Infra Part IV.
Infra Parts ILA, V.B.
Infra note 261 and accompanying text.
Infra Part III.A.
Infra Part HI.
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is generated. 9 Tax planning opportunities abound,'0 diverting resources
away from efficient economic activity and into elaborate tax avoidance
schemes." Such tax shelters are often not available to smaller local
businesses, which places them at a competitive disadvantage with their
larger national competitors.'12 Additionally, continual litigation over state
tax jurisdiction imposes unnecessary costs on both states and businesses
alike.'"
Congress has recently considered legislation to address some of these
problems. The Business Activity Tax Simplification Act (BATSA) would
establish a nationwide physical presence standard for state income tax
jurisdiction; it has been introduced several times, but never enacted.'14 This
Note proposes, as an alternative to BATSA, a two-pronged approach: The
establishment of a nationwide standard for income tax nexus based on
economic presence, coupled with the imposition of a uniform method of
income apportionment."' This approach would alleviate many of the
aforementioned problems that arise under the current system. That is to
say, in tax policy parlance, it would greatly increase the equity, efficiency,
6
and simplicity of state business activity taxation.'1
Part 11 of this Note documents the substantial erosion of the state
corporate income tax base and identifies the increased use of tax planning
opportunities by multistate businesses as the primary culprit. Part III
explains how state corporate income taxes are levied on multistate
businesses; it includes a discussion of constitutional and statutory
limitations on state tax authority as well as methods states may employ
unilaterally to close certain corporate tax loopholes. Part IV identifies an
open question under current law-whether a state may assert income tax
jurisdiction over a non-physically present business based on its economic
presence-and explores through case law the policy implications of
answering this question affirmatively or negatively. Part V proposes the
establishment of a nationwide standard for income tax jurisdiction based on
economic presence, coupled with the imposition of a uniform method of
9. See, e.g., infra Part ILI.B.3 (discussing Public Law 86-272); infra Part III.C
(describing state efforts to remedy jurisdictional problems under the current system).
10. Infra PartIV.
11. InfraPart VI.B.
12. Infra Part VLA.
13. Infra note 261 and accompanying text.
14. Infra Part VIL.A.
15. InfraPart V.
16. InfraPart VI.
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income apportionment. Part VI analyzes this proposal in light of three
core tax principles: equity, efficiency, and simplicity. Finally, Part VII
contrasts this Note's proposal with BATSA' s physical presence standard
for income tax jurisdiction, which is analyzed under the same criteria.
7
1. The DisappearingState CorporateIncome Tax'1

Business activity taxes' 8 -and corporate income taxes in particularare an important source of revenue for state governments.' 9 Such taxes
account for approximately 10% of all state tax revenue, or $75 billion per
year. 20 States rely on business activity taxes to fund anywhere from 4% to
20% of their budgets.2 State revenue departments and commentators
have expressed concern, however, that the increasingly aggressive use of
certain tax shelters has significantly eroded the state tax base.2
Moreover, many of these tax planning opportunities are effectively
available only to larger, multistate businesses.2
The result is an
17.

See Gary Comia et al., The DisappearingState Corporate Income Tax, 58 NAT'L

TAX J. 115 (2005) (describing state corporate income taxes as "disappearing").

18. The term "business activity taxes" refers not only to corporate income taxes but also
to franchise taxes, gross receipts taxes, and value added taxes. See MULTISTATE TAX
COMMISSION, FEDERALISM AT RISK 19 (2003) [hereinafter MULTISTATE TAX COMM'N],
available at
http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/MultistateTaxComimission/Resources/
Studies--and_Reports/Federalism-atRisk/FedatRisk--FINALREPORT.pdf (describing various
business activity taxes).
19. Id.
20. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE GOVERNMENT TAX COLLECTIONS (2007),
http://www.census.gov/govs/statetax/0700usstax.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2010) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). Total state business activity tax revenue calculated by
including corporate income tax revenue ($53.4 billion), corporate license tax revenue ($8.3
billion), and occupation and business tax revenue ($13.4 billion). Id
2 1. STEVEN MAGUIRE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, STATE CORPORATE INCOME
TAXES: A DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 1-2 (2006) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE], available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-93 11:1.
22. See, e.g., How Much Should Borders Mauler? Tax Jurisdictionin the New Economy:
Hearingon . 2721 Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the S. Comm. on Finance,
109th Cong. 2-3 (2006) [hereinafter Bucks] (Statement of Dan R. Bucks, Director, Montana
Department of Revenue) ("An appropriately structured operation can avoid business activity
tax liability and still exploit the marketplace in any given state ... [and the] state tax base is
seriously eroded [as a result]."); MICHAEL MAZEROv, C'rR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITES,
PROPOSED "BUSINESS ACTIVITY TAX NEXUS" LEGISLATION WOULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE
STATE TAXES ON CORPORATE PROFITS AN.D HARM THE ECONOMY 5 (2008), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/6-24-08sfp.pdf (describing states' efforts to "shut down [what is] perhaps
the most abusive state corporate tax shelter in widespread use").
23. See Bucks, supra note 22, at 3 (describing how one of the most pervasive state tax
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uneven distribution of the state tax burden across similar types of firmswith smaller, local businesses shouldering a disproportionately greater share.2
One way to measure the erosion of the state tax base is to look at the
average effective state tax rate on corporate income. This is the amount of tax
corporations actuallypay to states as a percentage of their profits, after taking
advantage of any available loopholes as well as explicit policy choices by states
to lower corporate tax burdens through decreased nominal tax rates or
increased deductions, credits, and other incentives for economic
development .25 The average effective tax rate has decreased by one-third since
the 1980s-from approximately 9% percent throughout the 1980s to roughly
6% in 2001.2 Evidence suggests that much of this reduction is the result of
increased utilization of tax planning opportunities by multistate corporations, as
opposed to explicit policy choices by states." In 2001, domestic tax sheltering
cost states an estimated $5 billion in lost tax reeu 2s-nearly 16% of all state
corporate income taxes collected.2
shelters, the out-of-state holding company, favors "large businesses at the expense of small
ones," resulting in uneven tax burdens among competing firms).
24. See id. at 4 (describing the inequity of the current state corporate income tax system).
As Montana's Director of Revenue explained:
The result of such sheltering is obvious: (a) An appropriately structured operation
can avoid business activity tax liability and still exploit the marketplace in any
given state; (b) In-state entities subject to state taxes face an unfair competitive
disadvantage; (c) The state tax base is seriously eroded; (d) Business income and
operations are not subjected to tax where the income is earned; and (e) The state
business activity tax falls unevenly across similar types of businesses, depending
solely on whether they have taken advantage of the sheltering oppoties ....
Id.
25. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1619 (9th ed. 2009) (defining effective tax rate as "a
taxpayer's tax liability divided by the amount of taxable income"); MULTISTATE TAx
COMMISSION, CORtPORLATE TAX SHELTERING AND THE IMPACT ON STATE CORPOnRE INCOME
TAx REVENUE COLLECTIONS 6 (2003) [hereinafter CORORA&TE TAx SHELTERING], availableat

http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/MultistateTaxCommission/Resources/Studies_and.Reports
/Corporate _Tax _Sheltering/Tax%/20Shelter%/20Reportpdf (describing some of the explicit policy
choices that states have made to reduce corporate tax burdens).
26. CORPORATE TAx SHELTERING, supra note 25, at 5-6.
27. See id at 6 (finding that only 25% of the "decline in the effective rates of state
corporate taxes is attributable to state legislative changes . . . ."); Comia et al., supra note
17, at 136 (stating that "evidence .. , suggests [that] corporate tax planning is an
important factor in explaining the decline in [state corporate income tax revenue]").
28. CORPORATE TAX SHELTERING, supra note 25, at 3, 5-6. An additional $5 billion
in lost state corporate income tax revenue was tied to international income tax sheltering,
an issue beyond the scope of this Note. Id. at 3, 4-5.
29. State corporate income tax revenue totaled approximately $31.7 billion in 2001.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE GOVERNMENT TAx COLLECTIONS:

gov/govs/statetax/Ol00usstax.htmI

(last

2001, http://www.census.

visited Feb. 23, 2010) (on file with the
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The erosion of the state corporate income tax base is especially
problematic given the precarious fiscal health of the states. Many states
will be grappling with severe budget shortfalls for years to come and can
ill afford the continued loss of tax revenue . 30 In fiscal year 2009, fortyfive states faced deficits that averaged 15% of their total budgets-nearly
$110 billion in total deficits.3 ' In fiscal year 2010, forty-eight states
faced budget gaps totaling over $192 billion, or an average deficit of
28% of their total budgets. 32 Similar deficits are projected for fiscal year
201 L"
11.

The Basic Mechanics of State CorporateIncome Taxation
A. FormularyApportionment

The basic mechanics of state corporate income taxation are
illustrated by the following hypothetical. Suppose that Company X
makes widgets. It is domiciled and headquartered in State A. It owns a
$12 million manufacturing plant in State A, maintains a $6 million
payroll in State A, and generates $100 million per year from sales to
customers in State A. Company X also sells to customers in State B,
where it owns a $4 million warehouse and maintains a $2 million payroll.
These operations generate $50 million in sales. Finally, Company X also
sells to customers in State C. It has no property or payroll in State C, but
solicits orders there via mail, telephone, and internet. The orders are
then shipped directly from the plant in State A, or from the warehouse in
State B. This activity generates an additional $50 million in sales.
Now suppose that all three states impose a corporate income tax,
and that Company X realizes a total profit of $10 million. How will this
income be taxed by each state? State A would seem to have the strongest
claim to taxing authority. It is the state of incorporation, where all goods
Washington and Lee Law Review).
30. See ELIZABETH MCNICHOL & NICHOLAS JOHNSON, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRioRITIES, RECESSION CONTINUES To BAITER STATE BUDGETS; STATE RESPONSES COULD

SLow RECOVERY 1 (2009), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-8-08sfp.pdf ("States are
facing a great fiscal crisis. At least 45 states faced or are facing shortfalls in their budgets
for this and/or next year, and severe fiscal problems are highly likely to continue into the
following year as well.").
3 1. Id. atl10.
32. Id. atS5.
33. Id. at 4 (projecting aggregate budget deficits of$180 billion for fiscal year 2011).
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are manufactured and where the most goods are sold. But States B and C
also have compelling justifications for taxation. State B provides all of the
government services necessary for Company X's warehousing operationssuch as police and fire protection, infrastructure, and a public school system
that supplies a competent local workforce. Furthermore, both states B and
C provide all of the government services necessary to furnish the markets
exploited by Company X,34 as well as court systems that Company X may
use to enforce the legal obligations of its customers and business partners in
the area. Thus, allocating Company Xs entire taxable income to any one
state is an unsatisfactory solution.3
Nor is it sufficient simply to divide Company Xs income among the
three states on the basis of where each sale occurs. This is because the
income that a multistate business derives from a sale is not generated solely
by its activity within the state where the product is delivered to the
consumer. For example, suppose a customer in State C places a telephone
order with Company X at its main office in State A. The warehouse in State
B then fills the order and ships it to the customer in State C. To apportion
all of the resulting income to State C would ignore the fact that much of the
economic activity that generated the income derived from the sale-such as
the manufacture of the goods, and the filling and shipping of the orderoccurred in states A and B. As a result, allocating Company Xs income
34. See John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudentialand Policy
Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 319, 378 n.331 (2004) ("Taxes are what we pay to
live in a society that allows a market to operate in the first instance. Like it or not, the
government is a 'silent partner' in the economy. . . that often is not appreciated until it
ceases to ftnction ......
35. See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION:
CORPORATE INCOME AND) FRANCHISE TAXES

9.02 (2d ed. 1993) ("It is because of such

competing claims of the States [and] . .. the difficulty of. .. attaching the entire proceeds of
sales to a single State, that allocation .. . of the proceeds of sales under net income taxes has
been largely rejected by the States."). Mazerov elaborates:
Services provided to corporations by states in which their production occurs
include police and fire protection provided to their facilities and their employees
while at work, water and sewage services, transportation infrastructure, and K12 and higher-education services that enable corporations to find adequatelyprepared workers. Public services provided by states in which corporations'
customers are located are also crucial to their ability to earn a profit; these
services include roads on which their goods are transported to their customers
and a judicial system that ensures that their customers pay their debts.
MICHAEL MAZEROV, CuT. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, THE "SINGLE SALES FACTOR"
FORMULA FOR STATE CORPORATE TAXES: A BOON To ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OR A
COSTLY GIVEAWAY? 77 n.6 (rev. 2005) (emphasis added), available at http://www.cbpp.
orglfiles/3-27-01 sfp.pdf.
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entirely on the basis of the destination of its sales is also an unsatisfactory
solution.3
Instead, the states that impose a corporate income tax rely on
formulary apportionment to determine what portion of a multistate firm's
income each may tax.37 Formulary apportionment uses certain factorssales, capital, and labor--to measure the business activity of a particular
corporate taxpayer in a particular state.3 A company's total taxable income
is then apportioned to each state according to the formula.39 There are at
least six basic types of apportionment formulas employed by states .40 For
simplicity, let us assume that States A, B and C all use the most common
apportionment formula, the double-weighted sales factor formula, which is
used by twenty states.4 With respect to State A, the formula would provide
as follows:
Payroll in A
Prperty nA
+
2(Sales inA
kUalesin A,H, and C) Propertyin A,B, and C +arf
n B and CXTxbeIcm
4

Substituting the figures from our hypothetical yields the following:
)+
T'O-"

4

6 +

-

0. 62 5

36. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 35, 9.02 ("Whatever the law of
contracts as to where the contract is made, or the law of sales as to where title passes, such
considerations ought not be decisive in determining State fiscal policy as to how the receipt
of income should be taxed."); MAzEROV, supra note 35, at 77 n.6 (describing benefits that
businesses derive from states in which they produce goods and from states in which they sell
goods); see also infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (critiquing sales-only
apportionment).
37. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 21, at 2 (describing the
methods of formulary apportionment employed by the forty-five states that impose a
corporate income tax).
38. See MAzERov, supra note 35, at 15-17 (describing formulary apportionment). But
see Charles E. Mcbure, Jr., The State CorporateIncome Tax:~ Lambs in Wolves' Clothing, in
THE ECoNomics OF TAXATION 327, 328 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980)
("[Sltate corporate income taxes levied on multistate firms have essentially the same effect
as discriminatory state taxes on corporate payrolls, property, or sales .. , if the profits of the
firm are allocated among the states for tax purposes that include payrolls, property, or
sales

...

).

39. MAZEROV,supra note 35, at 15-17.
40. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 2 1, at 6 (describing the
following apportionment schemes: even-weight, even-weight hybrid, double-weight sales,
double-weight sales hybrid, single-factor sales, and "other").
41. MAzERov, supra note 35, at 22.
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The result is an apportionment factor of 0.625, meaning that State A
would levy its corporate income tax on 62.5% of Company X's total taxable
income. Similarly, State B's apportionment factor would be 0.250 and
State C's would be 0. 125, meaning the States B and C would levy tax on
25% and 12.5%, respectively, of Company X's total profit. In this example,
it is only because each state uses the same formula that the apportionment
factors from all three states add up to one, thus ensuring that Company X
pays state corporate income tax on precisely 100% of its taxable income.4
If each state used different apportionment formulas, Company X would
likely end up paying tax on less--or more-than 100% of its income,
depending on the particular formula used by each state .4 ' Thus, the lack of
a uniform method of income apportionment among the states produces
undesirable "gaps and overlaps in the tax bases of the various states.""4
The problems inherent to a nonuniform system of apportionment are
exacerbated by the increasing popularity of sales-only apportionment.4
States that switch from three-factor apportionment to a formula based only

42. See, e.g., R. Todd Ervin, Comment, The Taxation of FinancialInstitutions: Will
Physical Presence or Economic Presence Win the Day?, 19 VA. TAx REv. 515, 530-31
(2000) ("The problem of multiple taxation would be largely eliminated if all states asserting
jurisdiction adopted uniform apportionment and allocation stadards....1)
43. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 21, at 16 ("Many economists
and other researchers who analyze state corporate income taxes agree that ... [t]he current
mosaic of state corporate income tax rules creates economic inefficiencies [due to] ...
potential gaps and overlaps in taxation.") Judging from the data in Part 11, however, it does
not appear that the taxation of more than 100% of multistate corporation income is a
rampant problem. Corporations likely devote significant resources to structuring their
operations in ways that avoid this result. Increased uniformity among state apportionment
methods would free up such finite resources for use in economic activities that actually
benefit society-say, building better widgets-rather than mere navigation through the
varied patchwork of state income tax rules so as to avoid multiple taxation. Uniformity
would also reduce tax planning opportunities that are problematic from both an equity and
efficiency perspective, as discussed in Parts VI.A.-B.
44. Charles E. Mcbure, Jr., The Nuttiness of State and Local Taxes--and the Nuttiness
of Responses Thereto, 25 STATE TAX NOTES 841, 849 (2002).
45. See id at 850 ("There has been a recent trend for states using the traditional
equally weighted three-factor apportionment formula to reduce the weight on payroll and
property and increase the weight on sales."). Only nine states continue to use an equally
weighted three-factor formula. MAzEROV, supra note 35, at 22. Twenty states doubleweight the sales factor in their three-factor formula, as stated previously. Supra note 41 and
accompanying text. Moreover, fourteen states have eliminated the property and payroll
factors entirely and rely instead on sales-only apportionment formulas. MAzEROV, supra
note 35, at 22. The number of states employing sales-only apportionment has doubled since
2002. Compare McLure, supra note 44, at 850 (finding seven such states in 2002), with
MAZEROV, supra note 35, at 22 (finding fourteen such states in 2005).
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on sales typically do so in the hope of spurring economic development. 4 A
state that employs sales-only apportionment will tax a multistate business
based solely on how many sales are made within its borders; the amount of
property and payroll a firm has in that state becomes irrelevant for income
tax purposes.
Consequently, certain corporate taxpayers, especially
manufacturers, stand to benefit from a shift to sales-only apportionment in
their states of production (where capital and labor inputs are high),
especially if three-factor apportionment remains the rule in their market
states (where capital and labor inputs are loW). 4 1 Under such a scenario,
less income is attributed to the taxpayer's production states with no
corresponding increase in income attributed to its market states. This
creates what is referred to as "nowhere income" that is untaxed by any
state.4 To illustrate this point, suppose that Company X persuades State A
to adopt a sales-only apportionment formula, which would provide as
follows:
Sales inA
Sales in A,B, and C X Taxable Income
Substituting the figures from our hypothetical yields the following:
(100) =0.5
200)
The result is an apportionment factor of 0.5, meaning that State A
would levy its corporate income tax on 50% of Company X's total taxable
income. This is in marked contrast to the apportionment factor of 0.625 in
the prior example, in which State A employed a double-weighted sales
factor formula. Assuming that States B and C do not change their formulas,

46. See Mcbure, supra note 44, at 851 ("The shift to sales-only apportionment is
probably best attributed to an economic development objective."). But see MAZEROV, supra
note 35, at 3 7-55 (questioning the economic development rationale for states to switch to
sales-only apportionment).
47. See MAzEROV, supra note 35, at 1-2 (discussing the rise of sales-only
apportionment). As Mazerov notes:
If all states adopted a sales-only formula, much of the tax savings received by
particular multistate corporations in particular states would be offset by higher
tax payments by these same corporations in other states. That is why multistate
corporations are pushing adoption of the single sales factor formula in a limited
number of states but not on a nationwide basis.
Id. at 2.
48. Id. at 24.
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the outcome is that 12.5% of Company X's entire taxable income
"disappears" for state income tax purposes.4
From a tax policy standpoint, this result makes little sense. A metric
based solely on sales does a poor job of approximating the degree of
income-producing activity that occurs in each state.5 0 Indeed, McLure has
declared sales-only apportionment to be downright "nutty."51 It is also not
necessarily a taxpayer-friendly approach to income apportionment, 52 as
sales-only apportionment may arbitrarily increase state income taxes for
some businesses even as it arbitrarily reduces state income taxes. for
others.5
B. JurisdictionalLimitations on State Income Taxation
A state may not levy an income tax on a business if it lacks jurisdiction
to do so. There are three basic limitations on state income tax jurisdiction:

49. 0.625 -0.5 =0.125 or 12.5%.
50. See McLure, supra note 44, at 850 ("It would be ludicrous, at best, to suggest that
the sales-only apportionment formula reflects where income originates better then the threefactor formula."). McLure continues:
Does anyone seriously believe that only sales-which are determined on a
destination-basis-accurately reflects where income is earned in the oil
industry? Would that have been equally true during the energy crisis, when oil
companies were making above-normal profits? Should a firm attribute no more
income to a state where it has oil wells and refineries than to other states where
it has the same amount of sales?
Id
5 1. Id. at 849.
52. See MAzEROV, supra note 35, at 2 (stating that sales-only apportionment "provides
tax cuts to some corporations and imposes tax increases on others"). As Mazerov explains:
Corporations with relatively large shares of their nationwide property and
payroll in a state .. , but a relatively small share of their nationwide sales in that
state receive tax cuts. Corporations with relatively little property and payroll in
a state. ...
but significant shares of their nationwide sales in that state experience
tax increases.
Id "Manufacturers are most likely to fit th[e former] profile, typically producing goods for a
regional, nationwide, or worldwide market from a relative handful of plants." Id. at 2 1.
53. To be more precise, this result is arbitrary from a tax policy perspective. As a
matter of realpolilik, however, it makes perfect sense. Of the fourteen states that have
switched to sales-only apportionent, five states apply the formula primarily or exclusively
to manufacturers-the taxpayers with the most to gain from the enactment of sales-only
apportionment in their states of production. Id at 22-23.
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the Due Process Clause,"4 the Commerce Clause," and Public Law 86-272
(P.L. 86-272).5
1. The Due Process Clause

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
"[n]o ... state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law."5 7 In regard to state income taxation, the relevant
inquiry is "whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal
relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state-that is,
5
whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return ."'
Thus,
the income of a multistate business may not be taxed by a state unless there
is some "minimal connection" 59 between the income-generating activities of
the business and the taxing state.6
This minimal connection requirement is essentially the same test used
to determine whether a state court may assert personal jurisdiction over a
defendant in civil litigation .6 ' The analysis required under International

54. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ..... )
55. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cI. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate
Commerce. ...among the several States. ... ").
56. Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-391
(2006)).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
58. See MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 128 S. Ct. 1498, 1505 (2008)
(describing due process limitations on state income tax jurisdiction (quoting Asarco, Inc. v.
Idaho Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982))).
59. The term "nexus" has also been used to describe the minimal connection an entity
must have with the taxing state in order to satisfy' due process requirements. See, e.g., Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) ("Despite the similarity in phrasing, the
nexus requirements of the Due Process and Comnmerce Clauses are not identical ....). This
creates the potential for confusion because the Commerce Clause also imposes a nexus
requirement for state assertion of taxing authority. See id (distinguishing between Due
Process nexus analysis and Commerce Clause nexus analysis).
60. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1978) (quoting Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co. v. Mo. State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 325 (1968)).
61. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 306-08 (applying the standard minimum contacts analysis
for personal jurisdiction to find that a state's assertion of sales and use tax jurisdiction
violated due process); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("To say
that ... [a] corporation is so far 'present' . .. [in a state] as to satisfy' due process
requirements, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance of suits against it in the courts of
the state, is to beg the question to be decided." (emphasis added)).
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Shoe Co. v. Washington62 is whether the defendant to be sued, or the
corporation to be taxed, "ha[s] certain minimum contacts with. .. [the
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. ,, 6 3 The standard set out in
International Shoe has evolved over the years as economic and social
realities have dictated. In McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co., 64 for
"[A] trend is clearly discernible toward
example, the Court noted:
expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over out-of-state
corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the
fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years.
Today, many commercial transactions touch two or more states."'65 Current
doctrine holds that if an entity "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state" then it can be brought under
that state's jurisdiction .6 6 Moreover, the Court has stated that "[s]o long as
a commercial actor's efforts are 'purposefully directed' toward residents of
another state, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of
6
physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.", 1
2. The Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to "regulate
commerce ... among the several states.",68 This power of Congress is
69
plenary and absolute, except as otherwise limited by the Constitution.
62. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 3 19-21 (holding that an out-of-state corporation that
'exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state" is subject to suit and taxation
in that state within the limits of due process).
63. Id. at 320 (citations omitted).
64. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (holding that an out-ofstate corporation that enters into a contract with a "substantial connection" to a state is
subject to suit in that state within the limits of due process).
65. Id. at 226.
66. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (quoting
Hanson v. Deckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
67. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (citations omitted).
68. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 3.
69. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 423 (1946) ("The commerce
clause is ... as [Chief Justice John] Marshall declared in Gibbons v. Ogden, a grant to
Congress of plenary and supreme authority over those subjects. The only limitation it places
upon Congress' power is in respect to what constitutes commerce.... .); Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824) ("This power, like all others vested in Congress, is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations,
other than are prescribed in the constitution .... [Tihe sovereignty of Congress, though
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The modern interpretation of the Commerce Clause grants Congress
regulatory power over the channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, as well as activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce. 70 Yet, the Commerce Clause is not simply an affirmative grant
of legislative authority to Congress to regulate interstate commerce. By
implication, it also prohibits states from acting within this sphere of
legislative authority allocated exclusively to Congress. 71 This implicit
restriction on the states is referred to as the "negative" or "dormant"
Commerce Clause. 72 Thus, states may not "~unjustifiably ... burden the
interstate flow of articles of commerce."7 3 In regard to state taxation, the
Court has outlined this prohibition as follows:
[W~e will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as
the "tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the
taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against
interstate commerce,
and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by
74

the State."

limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects....

.).

In regard to state income

taxation, the most relevant limitation on Congress' commerce clause power is the Due
Process Clause. See supra Part III.B. 1 (describing the due process limitations on state tax
jurisdiction).
70. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) ("Congress may regulate the
use of the channels of interstate commerce[,] . . . the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce... [and] those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.").
71. See Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829) ("We
do not think that the act. ...can .. , be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate
commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject.");
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) ("It is long established that, while a literal
reading evinces a grant of power to Congress, the Commerce Clause also directly limits the
power of the States to discriminate against interstate commerce." (citing Welton v. Missouri,
91 U.S. 275 (1876))).
72. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 311 n.9 (1994) ("Our
jurisprudence refers to the self-executing aspect of the Commerce Clause as the 'dormant' or
'negative' Commerce Clause.").
73. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Env't Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994).
74. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 290, 311 (1992) (quoting Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)). As the Court explained:
The Complete Auto analysis reflects ... concerns about the national economy.
The second and third parts of that analysis, which require fair apportionment and
nondiscrimination, prohibit taxes that pass an unfair share of the tax burden onto
interstate commerce. The first and fourth prongs, which require a substantial
nexus and a relationship between the tax and state-provided services, limit the
reach of state taxing authority so as to ensure that state taxation does not unduly
burden interstate commerce.
Id at 313.

GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT STATE CORPORATE TAX REFORM

289

Moreover, the Supreme Court has long held that Congress, in the
exercise of its affirmative Commerce Clause authority, may eliminate the
restrictions that the dormant Commerce Clause places upon states.7
In
other words, Congress may authorize state activity that would otherwise
violate the dormant Commerce Clause.7 This general proposition applies
with equal force to the specific matter of state taxation of multistate
businesses, which clearly affects interstate commerce.
Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has stated that "[ilt is clear that the legislative power
granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution would
amply justify the enactment of legislation requiring all States to adhere to
78
uniform rules for the division of income."
Congress has exercised its Commerce Clause power to expand state
taxing authority. For example, Congress has authorized states to tax out-of75. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945) ("It is no longer
debatable that Congress, in the exercise of the commerce power, may authorize the states, in
specified ways, to regulate interstate commerce or impose burdens upon it."); Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946) ("This broad authority Congress may exercise
alone .. . or in conjunction with coordinated action by the states, in which case limitations
imposed for ... preservation of their powers become inoperative and only those designed to
forbid action altogether by any power or combination of powers in our governmental system
remain effective.").
76. Of course, the same cannot be said of the Due Process Clause. See Quill, 504 U.S.
at 305 ("[W]hile Congress has plenary power to regulate commerce among the States and
thus may authorize state actions that burden interstate commerce .. , it does not similarly
have the power to authorize violations of the Due Process Clause.").
77. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946) (holding that
Congress was within its power under the Commerce Clause to authorize state taxation of
national insurance companies that would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause).
As the Court explained:
The power of Congress over commerce exercised entirely without reference to
coordinated action of the states is not restricted, except as the Constitution
expressly provides, by any limitation which forbids it to discriminate against
interstate commerce and in favor of local trade. Its plenary scope enables
Congress not only to promote but also to prohibit interstate commerce, as it has
done frequently and for a great variety of reasons.
Id Even the narrower conception of Commerce Clause authority set forth in more recent
cases-such as United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), Printz v. United States, 512
U.S. 898 (1997), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)-poses no threat to the
well-recognized principle that Congress has the authority to regulate state taxation of
interstate commerce. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, Federal Constitutional Limitations on
Congressional Power to Legislate Regarding State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 53
NAT'L TAx J. 1307, 1324 (2000) ("There is no doubt that Congress has the power under the
Commerce Clause to ... permit the states to tax [interstate] commerce in ways that the
[dormant] Commerce Clause currently forbids.").
78. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978).
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state insurance companies more heavily than local insurers' 7 9 even though
such a policy, without congressional approval, would discriminate
unconstitutionally against interstate commerce.8 Similarly, Congress has
empowered states to levy sales taxes on certain interstate telephone calls
when it would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause .8'
Congress has also exercised its Commerce Clause authority to restrict
state taxation of interstate commerce. 82 The broadest limitation Congress
has imposed on state taxing authority is P.L. 86-272,8 which carves out a
range of activities in which out-of-state vendors of tangible personal
property may engage without establishing a substantial nexus in a market
state.84 Congress has also imposed narrower, industry-specific limitations
79. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006). Specifically, § 1011
provides:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that
silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier
to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.
Id.; see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 410, 430-31 (1946) (relying on
the McCarran-Ferguson Act to reject a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a 3% tax on
premiums that applied only to out-of-state insurance companies).
80. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting that Congress may remove
dormant Commerce Clause restrictions on state taxation authority); see also Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (reaffirming the Complete Auto test for state
taxation under the dormant Commerce Clause).
81. See Charles E. McLure, Jr. & Walter Hellerstein, Congressional Intervention in
State Taxation: A Normative Analysis of Three Proposals, 102 TAX NOTES 1375, 1378-79
(2004) (discussing the Mobile Telecommunications Sourcing Act (MTSA)). Congress
passed the MTSA in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Sweet, which
held that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibited states from taxing particular interstate
telephone calls. Id. at 1379; Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 263 (1989). The ruling had
the effect of preventing any state from taxing certain calls. McLure & Hellerstein at 1379.
Congress responded by simultaneously expanding and restricting state taxation authority:
The expansion of state power is provided by the grant of authority to the state of
the customer's home service provider to tax the charge for wireless services
regardless of whether that state possesses power to tax the call under the
preexisting standards of Goldberg v. Sweet. The contraction of state power is
contained in the final clause that prevents any state other than the state of the
customer's home service provider from taxing those charges, even if that state
possessed power under Goldberg v. Sweet to tax the charge.
Id.
82. See McLure & Hellerstein, supra note 81, at 1376 ("Apart from ... [P.L. 86-272],
Congress has restricted states' power (other than their power to tax the federal government
or its instrumentalities) only in narrowly defined circumstances.").
83. Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-391
(2006)).
84. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing P.L. 86-272).
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on state taxing authority. 85 For example, Congress has prohibited states
from taxing certain property-such as that of railroads,8 motor carriers, 7
and air carriers8 8
or heavily than other commercial and industrial
property.
3. The "Safe Harbor"of Public Law 86-2 72
Passed in 1959, P.L. 86-272 89 was the first statutory limitation on state
tax jurisdiction ever imposed by Congress, and it remains the broadest. 90 It
carves out a range of activities in which out-of-state vendors of tangible
personal property may engage without establishing a substantial nexus with
a market state for business activity tax purposes. 9 ' Specifically, P.L. 86272 permits such firms to engage in the "solicitation of orders" within a
market state without becoming taxable there, as long as it approves and
ships those orders from outside the state.9
85. See Kendall L. Houghton & Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic
Commerce: Perspectives on Proposalsfor Change and Their Constitutionality,2000 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 9, 63 n.127 (2000) (listing examples of such limitations).
86. Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 49 U.S.C. § 11501
(2006).
87. See 49 U.S.C. § 14502(b) (2006) (prohibiting states from taxing "motor carrier
transportation property" more heavily than 'other commercial and industrial property").
88. See id. § 401 16(2)(A) (2006) (prohibiting states from taxing "air carrier
transportation property" more heavily than "other commercial and industrial property of the
same type").
89. Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-391
(2006)).
90. See Michael T. Fatale, Federalism and State Business Activity Tax Nexus:
Revisiting Public Law 86-2 72, 21 VA. TAx Rnv. 435, 437 (2002) ("Public Law 86-272. ..
was the first federal statute to impose general restrictions upon the state's power to tax.");
McLure & Hellerstein, supra note 81, at 1376 ("Public Law 86-272, which limits.. . states'
power to tax income that an out-of-state vendor derives from sales into a state when the
vendor's only activities in the state are the solicitation of orders for tangible personal
property, is the most significant piece of federal legislation restricting state taxing power.").
91. See McLure & Hellerstein, supra note 81, at 1376 ("Public Law 86-272 limit.. .
states' power to tax income that an out-of-state vendor derives from sales into a state when
the vendor's only activities in the state are the solicitation of orders for tangible personal
property ....
92. See 15 U.S.C. § 381 (a) (2006) (describing activities out-of-state firms may engage
in without establishing a substantial nexus with a market state). Congress did not define
"solicitation," however, and the lack of a clear definition remains problematic to this day.
See Fatale, supra note 90, at 477-78 n.245 (describing the lack of a clear definition of
"solicitation"). As one commentator explains:
For years, tax practitioners urged the Supreme Court to step in and define the
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A return to our hypothetical illustrates the effect of P.L. 86-272 on
state income tax jurisdiction. Clearly, State A may tax Company X because
it established a substantial nexus with State A by incorporating and
operating a manufacturing plant there. State B may also tax Company X
because the maintenance of a warehouse within its borders creates a
substantial nexus there. State C, however, may not tax any portion of
Company X's income. This is because Company X has no physical
presence in State C and is engaged in the solicitation of orders for tangible
personal property-widgets, in this case-that are filled and shipped from
outside the state.9 The business operations of Company X therefore fall
within the "safe harbor" of P.L. 86-272. As a result, 12.5% of Company
X's total profit-t4he amount attributable to State C-potentially will not be
taxed by any state, resulting once again in nowhere income.
Public Law 86-272 was passed in haste 94 amid concerns that a recent
Supreme Court decision, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota,95 had created uncertainty about the level of activity in which an
out-of-state corporation could engage within a market state without
establishing a substantial nexus for income tax purposes.9 The safe harbor
of P.L. 8 6-272 was therefore intended as an "effective stopgap or temporary
solution while further studies are made of the problem." 97 Fifty years later,
however, a permanent legislative fix has yet to materialize.9
term 'solicitation.' Thirty-three years after the enactment of Public Law 86-272,
the Court did so in Wisconsin Department of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr.,
Co., whereupon commentators concluded that the term remains ambiguous ....
Id.
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 381(a) (2006) (describing activities out-of-state firms may engage
in without establishing a substantial nexus with a market state).
94. See Fatale, supra note 90, at 437 ("Responding to intense business lobbying,
Congress quickly deliberated the Act and passed it in just over six months, giving the states
very little input.").
95. See Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452 (1959)
(holding that an out-of-state corporation that uses its employees to solicit orders within a
market state may establish a substantial nexus there for income tax purposes).
96. See Heublein, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 409 U.S. 275, 280 n.5 (1972) ("'Persons
engaged in interstate commerce are in doubt as to the amount of local activities within a
State that will be regarded as forming a sufficient 'nexus' . .. with the State to support the
imposition of a tax on net income from interstate operations and 'properly apportioned' to
the State."' (quoting S. REP. No. 658, at 2-3 (1959))).
97. 5. REP. No. 658, 2-3 (1959).
98. See Fatale, supra note 90, at 438 ("Congress passed Public Law 86-272 as a
'temporary' or 'stop-gap' measure, but has not revisited the Act in the forty-three years since
its enactment." (quoting S. REP. No. 658, 2-3 (1959))).
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4. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
At issue. in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota9 9 was whether North Dakota
could require Quill Corporation (Quill), a mail-order retailer of office
equipment and supplies, to collect sales tax'00 from its North Dakota
customers and remit the revenue to the state. The disputed North Dakota
law imposed a sales tax collection duty on any vendor that advertised three
or more times a year in the state.'0 ' The validity of North Dakota's
assertion of sales tax jurisdiction turned on whether Quill had established
with the state the minimum contacts required under the Due Process Clause
and the substantial nexus required under the dormant Commerce Clause.' 02
Quill had no physical presence in North Dakota. No Quill employees
lived or worked there, and Quill owned no tangible property in the state.'0 3
However, Quill generated roughly $1 million in sales to approximately
3,000 North Dakota customers by solicitation through "catalogs and flyers,
advertisements in national periodicals, and telephone calls." 104

99. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992) (reaffirming that the
dormant Commerce Clause protects "vendors 'whose only connection with customers in the
[taxing] state is by common carrier or the United States mail' . .. from state-imposed duties
to collect sales and use taxes" (quoting Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S.
753, 758 (1967))).
100. This Note uses the term "sales tax" to refer to "use tax" as well as sales tax. Sales
taxes are generally imposed on consumers that purchase tangible personal property within
the taxing state, whereas use taxes are imposed on consumers that purchase tangible personal
property outside the taxing state for use within the taxing state. See JEROME R. HELLERSTEiN
& WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION: SALES AND USE, PERSONAL INCOME, AND DEATH
AND GIFT TAXES IT 12.03, 16.01 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the difference between sales taxes

and use taxes). Use taxes are therefore designed to "safeguard State sales tax revenues from
erosion by purchases of goods outside the State, and to protect local merchants from loss of
business to border and other States that either have no sales tax or whose sales tax rate is
lower than that of the merchant's State." Id. 16.01. Thus, sales taxes and use taxes can be
thought of as complementary sides of the same coin, and the technical distinctions that exist
between the two are not relevant to this Note.
101. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6.
102. See id at 313 ("[A] corporation may have the 'minimum contacts' with a taxing
State as required by the Due Process Clause, and yet lack the 'substantial nexus' with that
State as required by the Commerce Clause.").
103. Id. at 302. Technically, Quill did hold title to "a few floppy diskettes" in the state
as it "licensed a computer software program to some of its North Dakota customers that
enabled them to check Quill's current inventories and prices and to place orders directly."
Id at 315 n.8, 302 n. 1. However, the State conceded that this seemed "a slender thread upon
which to base nexus," and the Court agreed. Id at 315 n.8.
104. Idat302.
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The Court ruled that the Due Process Clause did not bar North
Dakota's assertion of sales tax jurisdiction over Quill because the
05
corporation purposefully directed its activities at North Dakota residents.1
Given the evolution of Due Process Clause jurisprudence over the latter
half of the twentieth century,106 this determination by the Court was hardly
surprising. It simply represented a straightforward application of the
minimum contacts test first set forth in InternationalShoe. 107 As a result,
Quill's lack of physical presence in North Dakota was of no moment for
08
due process purposes.1

The Court declined, however, to extend this reasoning to its dormant
Commerce Clause analysis:
Despite the similarity in phrasing, the nexus requirements of the Due
Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical. The two standards are
animated by different constitutional concerns and policies.
Due process centrally concerns the fundamental fairness of
governmental activity. Thus, at the most general level, the due process
nexus analysis requires that we ask whether an individual's connections
with a State are substantial enough to legitimate the State's exercise of
power over him. We have, therefore, often identified "notice" or "fair
warning" as the analytic touchstone of due process nexus analysis. In
contrast, the Commerce Clause and its nexus requirement are informed
not so much by concerns aboutfairnessfor the individual defendant as
by structural concerns about the effects of state regulation on the

nationaleconomy.

0

The Court went on to find that North Dakota's assertion of sales tax
jurisdiction over Quill violated the dormant Commerce Clue"O It noted
that there are more than 6,000 state and local sales tax jurisdictions, each of
105.
106.
107.
(holding
activities

Id. at 308.
Supra Part llI.B.1.
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
that an entity which "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
within the forum State" is properly subject to its jurisdiction (quoting Hanson v.

Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958))).
108. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) ("So long as a
commercial actor's efforts are 'purposefully directed' toward residents of another State, we
have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal
jurisdiction there." (citations omnitted)).
109. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312 (emphasis added). The term substantial nexus is also
sometimes used to describe the minimum contacts required to sustain a state tax levy under
the Due Process Clause. See id ("Despite the similarity in phrasing, the nexus requirements
of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical.").
110. Idat317-18.
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which might impose a similar collection duty upon Quill."' The Court
2
concluded that such a result would unduly burden interstate commerce."
In reaching its conclusion, the Court was influenced by the need for
"settled expectations" in the sales tax arena." 3 In reaffirming the physical
presence definition of substantial nexus for sales tax, the Court preserved a
twenty-five-year-old safe harbor for mail-order catalogue companies first
4
established in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department Of Revenue."
Stare decisis considerations weighed heavily in the Quill decision, as the
Court acknowledged that "contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence
might not dictate the same result were the issue [of substantial nexus] to
arise for the first time today.""' And while the Court conceded that the
physical presence distinction established by Bellas Hess was indeed
somewhat "artificial at its edges," it accorded great value to the clarity that
6
the bright-line rule provided."
It remains an open question, however, whether Quill represents a
jurisdictional limitation on state income taxation. Quill is important
primarily because it clarified the difference between the Due Process
Clause and dormant Commerce Clause limitations on state tax
jurisdiction." 7 Unfortunately, because the case dealt with state sales tax
jurisdiction, this clarity does not extend to the state income tax arena." 8 As
111. Idat 313n.6.
112. Idat3l17-18.
113. Idat3l6.
114. See Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967)
(holding that the Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause prohibit states from imposing a
sales and use tax collection duty on vendors whose only connection with customers in the
taxing state is by common carrier or the United States mail).
115. Quill,504 U.S. at3ll1.
116. Id. at 315. As the majority explained:
Such a rule firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority to
impose duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces litigation concerning
those taxes. This benefit is important, for as we have so frequently noted, our
law in this area is something of a "quagmire' and the "application of
constitutional principles to specific state statutes leaves much room for
controversy and confuision and little in the way of precise guides to the States in
the exercise of their indispensable power of taxation.
Id at 315-16 (citations omitted).
117. See id at 305 ("[A]lthough we have not always been precise in distinguishing
between the two [in state taxation cases], the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause
are analytically distinct.").
118. See id. at 314 ("[W]e have not, in our review of other types of taxes, articulated the
same physical-presence requirement that Bellas Hess established for sales and use
taes. .. .)
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Part IV discusses how state courts disagree over whether Quill's physical
presence standard for sales tax nexus is applicable to income tax jurisdiction, and
how the Supreme Court has declined to reconcile such conflicting interpretations
of its ruling in Quill. At the very least then, Quill represents an influential source
of confuision under the current state corporate income tax system."19
C "Throwback"
States have at their disposal several tools to close existing tax loopholes
under the current jurisdictional fr-amework.
"Throwback" is a statutory
mechanism available to states in which sales originate and applicable to
businesses that have established a substantial nexus with that state.'120 A
throwback rule allows such a state to tax nowhere income by treating sales to
certain other states (states in which a business has not established a substantial
nexus) as sales that occurred within the taxing state where the sale originated.' 2 '
Such receipts are essentially "thrown back" to the taxing state and factored into
the numerator of its apportionment formula. Approximately half of the states that
22
impose a corporate income tax have enacted throwback provisions.1
To illustrate the effect of throwback, recall from our hypothetical that
Company X had established a substantial nexus in both State A and State B.

119.

See, e.g.,

MICHAEL MAZEROV, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITES, CLOSING

THREE COMM~ON CORPORATE INCOME TAX LOOPHOLES COULD RAISE ADDITIONAL REVENUE
FOR MANY STATES

21 n. 19 (rev. 2003), available at http://www.cbpp.org/archiveSite/4-9-

02sfp.pdf (discussing the unclear state of the law); Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of

Electronic Commerce, 52

TAX L. REv.

425, 445 (1997) ("[Alt this juncture, the law of nexus

is in a state of... considerable uncertainty. One cannot state with certainty precisely what
sorts of connections with a state will suffice for ... income .. . tax jurisdiction.").
120. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 35, 9.21l][b] (describing the
throwback rule). As Hellerstein and Hellerstein explain:
[Throwback] is based on the premise that the State of origin of a shipment of
goods is not justified in increasing its apportionment of net income of an
interstate seller, if a State that has the power to tax chooses not to exercise it, but
that such an increase is justified if the State of the destination lacks the
constitutional power to subject the vendor to its income tax.
Id Whatever the validity of this distinction, it does lead circuitously back to the original
problem that it is often not clear whether a state has the constitutional power to subject a
vendor to its income tax. This illustrates one major shortcoming of throwback as a tool for
reducing nowhere income. Infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
121. Supra note 120 and accompanying text.
122. See MAZEROV, supra note 119, at 5 (listing states that have adopted a throwback
rule).
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However, Company X had not established a substantial nexus with State C
because its activities there came within the safe harbor of P.L. 86-272. As a
result, while State A may levy its income tax on its apportioned share of
Company Xs income (62.5%), and State B may levy its income tax on its
apportioned share (25%), State C may not levy income tax on its share (the
remaining 12.5% of Company X's income). This income potentially would
not be taxed by any state. In such circumstances, State A and State B may
assert taxing jurisdiction over this nowhere income if it is derived from
shipments that originate in their state.123 So if State A were to employ a
throwback mechanism, the portion of the sales that Company X generated in
State C by shipping goods there from its plant in State A would be
apportioned to State A, even though such sales would otherwise be
attributable only to State C. Similarly, if State B were to adopt a throwback
rule, the remaining portion of the sales that Company X generated in State C
by shipping goods from its warehouse in State B would be thrown back to State
B. In this simplified example, then, the throwback rules employed by States A
and B succeed at eliminating all of Company Xs nowhere income from State C
by allocating it based on where the shipment of sold goods originated.
Nevertheless, throwback rules suffer from three serious flaws that
render them an unsatisfactory solution to the nowhere income problem.
First, they do not provide for the equitable distribution of the tax revenue
that results from the captured nowhere income.124 That is, even if
throwback rules are able to eliminate the nowhere income of a particular
business, they still fail to ensure that each state that furnishes a market
exploited by that business is able to receive its fair share of the tax revenue
created by activity within its borders.125 To return to our hypothetical, for
example, why should States A and B receive a windfall in tax revenue at the
expense of State C, where the revenue originated? There is no justification
for this result. This effect is particularly unfair when one considers that
windfall States A and B already enjoy the job creation and other economic
123. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (explaining the throwback rule).
124. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 35, 9.2 1[1][c] ("In some cases, the
nexus of the origin State with the sale may warrant a throwback, but in others the
relationships of the State of origin to the transactions may be minimal, so that the throwback
rule results in distortion."); see also Cass Vickers, Do States Want Uniform Corporate
Income Taxes? Interview with Bruce Johnson and Stephen Kranz, 50 STATE TAx NoTES
803, 806 (2008) ("The real villain in the piece is P.L. 86-272. The throwback and throwout
rules are very imperfect attempts to deal with a bad federal law." (statement of Bruce
Johnson)).
125. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (describing the benefits that out-ofstate firms derive from market state governments).
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development benefits-such as property and payroll tax revenueassociated with Company X's manufacturing plant and warehouse. If State
C is denied the ability to tax the income generated within its borders, outof-state businesses may avail themselves of its market and laws while
passing all of the cost of upkeep onto their in-state competitors.
The second problem with throwback rules is that their utility depends
on a clear definition of substantial nexus, but no such definition exists.12
States that utilize throwback measures (and the taxpayers that comply with
them) must determine not only which of the other forty-nine states to which
sales were made but also whether the taxpayer has established a substantial
nexus with each such state; otherwise, the taxing state cannot know which
sales to throw back.1' Thus, throwback is merely a band-aid solution that
fails to address the more fundamental problem-the lack of a clear
definition of substantial nexus under current law-while further
complicating an already needlessly complex state of affairs. Indeed, such
"fixes" illustrate why state corporate income taxes have been criticized as
"~probably the most inefficient, least cost-effective revenue source available

to the states."128

Third, throwback rules do not apply to certain types of income.129 For
example, income derived from the sale or lease of intangible property is not
subject to throwback.130 Because some of the most significant state tax
loopholes involve income derived from intangibles,'13' throwback is not
effective at combating nowhere income in a way that ensures an equitable
distribution of tax revenue among the states in which income is

generated.132

126. See infra Part IV (discussing contradictory conclusions state courts have drawn
regarding Quill's applicability to income tax jurisdiction).
127. See HELLERSTEISJ & HELLERsTEiN, supra note 35, 9.21[l][c] (citing the lack of "ease
of compliance and administration" as a shortcoming of the throwback rule because it "requires the
taxpayer to identify' by State of origin all sales whose destination is a State lacking the requisite
taxing power").
128. David Brinori, Stop Taxing CorporateIncome, 25 STATE TAX NoTES 47,48 (2002).
129. See Craig J. Langstraat & Emily S. Lemmon, Economic Newu: Legislative
Presumption or Legitimate Proposition?, 14 AKRON TAX J. 1, 7 (1999) ("[S]ales of intangible
personal property and services are not subject to [throwback].").
130. See HELLERSTEN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 35, 9.21[1][b] (explaining that
throwback rules apply only to sales of tangiblepersonal property).
13 1. See infra Part IV (discussing the taxation of out-of-state holding companies and out-ofstate financial services institutions).
132. A slightly more effective variation of throwback is "throwout" See HELLERSTEIN &
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 35, 9.21l][c] (describing throwout). Under a throwout rule, sales to
states where a business has not established a substantial nexus are "thrown out" of both the
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D. Combined Reporting
Combined reporting, or combination, is the final piece of the current
state corporate income tax puzzle. Combined reporting is another statutory
mechanism that states may apply to businesses that have established a
substantial nexus with their state. A state may require such a corporation to
file a combined report that includes the income of all out-of-state corporate
The
affiliates that participate in the unitary business of the in-state entity.'
of
the
income
to
the
combined
formula
apportionent
its
state then applies
34
affiliate.1
in-state
the
of
that
to
simply
than
rather
unitary business group
Combined reporting eliminates many of the benefits a corporation might
otherwise receive from certain tax planning maneuvers, such as the use of
out-of-state corporate subsidiaries to funnel income from a market state into

numerator and the denominator of the sales factor by the state, or states, in which the business is
taxable. The effect of the throwout variation is to "distribute non-taxable receipts among all the
States that impose income taxes, whereas the throwback rule attributes the entire receipt to the
State of origin of the shipments." Id Thus, throwout still suffers from some of the same basic
flaws as throwback. That is, neither method remedies the inequity that results when market states
are prevented from taxing their fair share of income generated within their borders. Supra notes
124-25 and accompanying text. In addition, neither method applies to income generated from
intangibles, thereby failing to counteract some of the most significant state tax loopholes. See
supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text (explaining that throwback is limited to sales of
tangible personal property); infra Part IV (discussing the taxation of out-of-state holding
companies and out-of-state financial services institutions).
133. See MeadWestvaco Corp. ex rel. Mead Corp. v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 128 S. Ct. 1498,
1508 (2008) ("[WMe have described the 'hallmarks' of a unitary relationship as functional
integration, centralized management, and economies of scale." (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comnm'r
of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980), and Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 50608 (1942))). Despite these "hallmarks" offered by the Court, it is often difficult to determine
whether a particular operation constitutes a unitary business. See HELLERsTEtN & HELLERSTEIN,
supra note 35, T18.11 l] ("Such generalizations, however, offer little practical guidance in
deciding unitary business controversies, and, indeed, they have been repeated both by courts
whose implementation of the doctrine has been highly restrictive, and by others that have applied
it on a very broad basis."). To complicate matters further, states have developed their own
varying definitions of a unitary business-which they are free to do, subject to the limits of the
Due Process Clause and the dormant Conmnerce Clause. See id. (describing both broad and
restrictive state definitions of a unitary business).
134. See McLure, supra note 44, at 848 (discussing combined reporting). As McLure
explains:
[Slome states . .. "combine" the activities of affiliated corporations deemed to
be engaged in a "unitary" business. Under unitary combination transactions
between members of the group (for example, sales, royalties, interest payments,
and dividends) are ignored and the income of the group is apportioned on the
basis of the apportionment factors of the group.
Id.
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another state that taxes such income less heavily or not at all.'13 1 Combined
reporting therefore provides individual states with a unilateral method of
remedying some of the same problems that this Note proposes to address
through federal legislation.13 6 Approximately half of the states that impose
37
a corporate income tax currently require combined reporting.1
While a state-by-state, combined reporting approach is not the focus of
this Note,138 it is instructive to consider why this alternative is consistent
with the jurisdictional limitations on state income taxation imposed by the
Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause. After all,
combined reporting allows a state to apportion the income of certain out-ofstate affiliates that have not established a substantial nexus with the state,
which at first blush might seem to raise concerns regarding extraterritorial
taxation. 139 Nevertheless, the constitutionality of combined reporting is
well-established.'40 It hinges on the principle that apportionment formulas
are meant to provide only a rough approximationof the income-producing
activity attributable to a particular state.'14 ' As a matter of federal
135. InfraPart W.A.
136. Combined reporting would not, however, resolve the two core defects of the current
state corporate income tax system: the lack of a clear and fair definition of substantial nexus
and the lack of uniformity in income apportionment. Supra Part 1. Only Congress has such
power. Supra Part 111.13.2. Nor would combined reporting address situations in which an outof-state firm is able to do a substantial amount of business in a market state without the need
for an in-state corporate affiliate. In such cases, there would be no entity within the unitary
business group that established a substantial nexus with the market state, and therefore no
entity that the market state could require to file a combined report. See supra Part Lll.B.2
(discussing dormant Commerce Clause limitations on state tax jurisdiction). Examples of such
taxpayers might include the out-of-state financial services institution, discussed in Part WV.B, as
well as firms that operate primarily over the internet.
137. MICHAEL MAZEROV, CTR. ON BUDGET & PouCY PRIORmTEs, A MAJORITY OF STATES
H~&v

Now

ADOPTED A KEY CORPORATE TAX REFORm-"COMBINED REPORTING" I (rev.

2009),

availableat http://www.cbpp.org/fles/4-5-07sfp.pdf (finding that twenty-three of the forty-five
states that impose a corporate income tax currently require combined reporting).
138. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (contending that federal intervention is
necessary).
139. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 181 (1983) ("Under
both the Due Process and the Commerce Clauses of the Constitution, a State may not, when
imposing an income-based tax, 'tax value earned outside its borders."' (citations omitted)).
140. See id at 165 ("This Court long ago upheld the constitutionality of the unitary
business/formula apportionment method, although subject to certain constraints." (citing Hans
Rees' Sons, Inc. v. N.C. ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123 (193 1))).
141. See id. (describing the constitutional rationale for combined reporting). As the Court
explained:
In the case of a more-or-less integrated business enterprise operating in more
than one State ... arriving at precise territorial allocations of "value" is often an
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constitutional law, then, states enjoy considerable leeway in how they
choose to apportion the income of a multistate corporation that has
established a substantial nexus with their state.14 2 Objections that combined
reporting violates the Due Process Clause or the dormant Commerce Clause
due to its lack of geographic specificity will fail, for as the Supreme Court
has held, such objections are "based on precisely the sort of formal
geographical accounting whose basic theoretical weaknesses justify resort
to formula apportionment in the first place."143 Instead, the critical issue in
such tax controversies is often whether an out-of-state affiliate is properly
includable as part of the unitary business group operating in the taxing
state.'"
IV. Post-Quill Jurisprudenceand the Problematic PhysicalPresence
Standardfor Income Tax Nexus
Let us now return to Quill. State courts have struggled to determine
whether Quill's physical presence requirement for sales tax jurisdiction
applies to income tax jurisdiction. Some state courts and commentators
answer this question affirmatively.14 5 One justification for this view is that
a state's assertion of sales tax jurisdiction merely imposes an administrative
duty upon the affected business-the duty to collect the sales tax from the
customer and remit it to the market state-whereas an income tax is
imposed directly on the firm's earnings.146 It is therefore argued that the
elusive goal, both in theory and in practice. For this reason and others, we have
long held that the Constitution imposes no single formula on the States, and that
the taxpayer has the "distinct burden of showing by clear and cogent evidence
that [the state tax] results in extraterritorial values being taxed .. .
Id. (citations omitted).
142. See id. at 181 (stating that fair apportionment requires only a "rational relationship
between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise" so that
the income apportioned is not "out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted"
in the taxing state (citations omitted)).
143. Id.
144. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing the unitary business
principle).
145. See, e.g., J.C. Penney Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831, 839 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 927 (2000) ("While it is true that.. . Quill...focused on use
taxes, we find no basis for concluding that the analysis should be different in the present
case .. , for franchise [taxes]."); Ervin, supra note 42, at 544 ("[A]doption of an economic
presence standard of nexus in the assessment of income taxes is inappropriate as long as a
physical presence standard applies in the context of sales and use taxes.").
146. See Ervin, supra note 42, at 544 ("[A] sales and use tax is nothing more than a
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degree of presence required for income tax nexus should be at least as
47
substantial as that required for sales tax nexus.1
Other state courts and commentators have countered that Quill's
physical presence standard does not extend to the income tax arena. This
view emphasizes that Quill was concerned with subjecting multistate
businesses to the onerous burden of collecting and remitting sales tax in up
to 6,000 different state and local sales tax jurisdictions.14 8 But as one
commentator notes, "[tlhese concerns are simply irrelevant in the income
tax context. Only 45 states and the District of Columbia impose a corporate
income tax."149 Consequently, the potential burden on interstate commerce
is much less severe for income taxation.' 50 Furhermore, the Court stated
explicitly in Quill that "we have not, in our review of other types of taxes,
articulated the same physical-presence requirement that Bellas Hess
5
established for sales and use taxes."'1 '
As a matter of federal policy, of course, it is irrelevant whether Quill
limits state income tax jurisdiction. Congress is free to pass legislation
extending or rejecting Quill's physical presence requirement in the income
tax context; it has the power to decide precisely what level of contact with a
state will subject a business to taxation. Before drawing any normative
conclusions regarding the appropriate standard for income tax nexus,
however, it is helpful to examine how a physical presence requirement
would apply to two important types of taxpayers: the out-of-state holding
company, discussed in Part IV.A, and the out-of-state financial services
institution, discussed in Part 1V.B. Moreover, the implications of these
exampl s extend to many other sorts of taxpayers, including those engaged
in electronic commerce. As this Part demonstrates, an income tax nexus
standar4 based on physical presence is quite problematic. The appropriate
collection ~luty imposed on the taxpayer, whereas a direct income tax is actually borne by the
taxpayer."i.
147. See id. ("[A]doption of an economic presence standard of nexus in the assessment
of income'taxes is inappropriate as long as a physical presence standard applies in the
context of sales and use taxes.").
148. Supra note 111 and accompanying text.
149. Sheldon H. Laskin, Only A Name? Trademark Royalties, Nexus, and Taxing That
Which Enriches, 22 AKRON TAx J. 1, 13 (2007).
150. See id ("[Blurdens of filing annual income tax returns reporting one's own income
to no more than 47 taxing authorities are ... [substantially less than those] of reporting use
tax collected from hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of purchasers in thousands of
taxing jurisdictions, on a quarterly or even monthly basis."). Forty-five states impose a
general corporate income tax, as do New York City and the District of Columbia. Id.
151. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992).
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standard should instead be based on economic presence, as proposed in
Part V.A.
A. Geoffr~ey 1: The Out-ofState Holding Company
The widespread use of out-of-state holding companies to shelter
income from state taxation illustrates why it is problematic to employ a
physical presence nexus standard for state income tax jurisdiction. A
classic example of this type of tax shelter is found in Geoffrey, Inc. v. South
Carolina Tax Commission (Geoffrey 14152 Geoffr'ey I involved an attempt
by Toys R Us to use an out-of-state holding company to funnel all of its
income, tax-free, out of a state in which it operated retail toy stores. The
scheme worked as follows: Toys R Us, a New Jersey corporation,
incorporated a wholly owned subsidiary in Delaware named Geoffrey and
transferred the Toys R Us name and trademark rights to it.' 3 Geoffrey then
leased these rights back to Toys R Us in exchange for royalties of one

percent on all sales by Toy R

US.'154

Pursuant to the agreement, Toys R Us

began operating in South Carolina and paying royalties to Geoffrey, which
Toys R Us deducted from its South Carolina taxable income as a business
expense.155 Geoffrey, which by design had no office or employees in South
152. See Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n (Geoffr-ey 1), 437 S.E.2d 13, 17-18 (S.C.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993) (refusing to apply Quill's physical presence
requirement to limit state income tax jurisdiction).
153. Id. at 15.
154. Id.
155. Id While it was not an issue in this case, out-of-state holding companies may
often take the additional tax-avoidance step of lending their royalty income back to the
parent company--a nontaxable event-which allows the parent company to then funnel
additional money out of the state in which it is operating by deducting the interest payments
to the holding company from its taxable income in the operating state. See, e.g., A&F
Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 189 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) ("[Royalty] payments
were made by an accounting journal entry. No checks were written and no physical transfer
of funds occurred.
Subsequently, the [out-of-state holding companies] entered into
agreements loaning ... [the] funds back to the related retail companies in the form of notes
receivable bearing a market rate of interest .. . ."). The physically present retail companies
then deducted these interest expenses from their North Carolina taxable income, while the
out-of-state holding companies claimed that their resulting interest income could not be
taxed by North Carolina because they had no physical presence within the state and thus had
not established a substantial nexus there. Id. While this argument was unsuccessful in A&F
Trademark, id. at 194-95, it likely would prevail in states that interpret Quill as a limit on
state income tax jurisdiction. See, e.g., inf/ra note 166 (listing states that have rejected an
economic presence standard for income tax nexus); infra note 168 (discussing cases that
have adopted a physical presence standard for income tax nexus).

304

3467 WASH & LEE L. REV 2 75 (2010)

Carolina, did not report this royalty income to South Carolina on the ground
that the company lacked a substantial nexus with the state. 516 Nor was
Geoffrey required to report the royalty income to its domicile state of
Delaware, which does not tax holding companies on income from
intangible assets.157 By interacting similarly with Toys R Us operations
across the country, Geoffrey-a company without a single full-time
employee-generated $55 million in profit in 1990 without paying any

income tax to any state.158

The South Carolina Supreme Court resolved this problem by
effectively adopting an economic nexus standard for state income taxation.
It began by dismissing Geoffrey's due process objections."' It stated that
Geoffrey had "purposefully directed its activities toward South Carolina's
economic forum ... by licensing intangibles for use in South Carolina and
receiving income in exchange for their use." 160 The court held that this
activity was sufficient to establish the minimum connection required by due
process for South Carolina to assert taxing authority.'16' Turning to the
dormant Commerce Clause, the court refused to extend the physical
presence requirement of Quill to income tax jurisdiction.16 1 It concluded
that "by licensing intangibles for use in this State and deriving income from
their use here, Geoffrey has a 'substantial nexus' with South Carolina" such
that taxation of its income would not violate the first prong of the Complete
Auto test.'163 The Supreme Court denied certiorari,' 4 declining to clarify
whether Quill applies to state income taxation. A number of other states

156. Geoffrey 1, 437 S.E.2d at 15.
157. See Laskin, supra note 149, at 6 n. 15 ('A Delaware-based corporation whose
activities in Delaware are limited to maintaining and managing intangible assets that
generate income, such as capital gains, dividends, interest and royalties, is exempt from
Delaware income tax." (citations omitted)). Nor is the availability of such tax shelters
limited to holding companies located in Delaware: "Similarly, royalty income is not subject
to Michigan's Single Business Tax. Nevada, South Dakota, and Wyoming do not impose a
corporate income tax." Id.
158. Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n (Geoffr-ey 1), 437 S.E.2d 13, 15 n.1 (S.C.
1993), cert. denied, 5 10 U.S. 992 (1993).
159. See id. at 19-20 (rejecting Geoffrey's due process objections on the basis of its
purposeful availment of the South Carolina market).
160. Id. at 16.
16 1. Id.
162. See id. at 18 ("In our view, Geoffr~ey's reliance on the physical presence
requirement of Bellas Hess is misplaced.").
163. Id.
164. 510 U.S. 992 (1993).
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have since followed Geoffrey Ps economic presence standard for income
65

tax nexus.1

B. J.C. Penney National Bank: The Out-of-State Financial
Services Institution
Other states have taken the opposite tack, rejecting economic presence
as a sufficient jurisdictional basis for taxing the income of an out-of-state
66
corporation, and instead extending the physical presence rule of Quill.1
7
The leading such case, JC Penney National Bank v. Johnson,1' did not
involve an out-of-state holding company, but rather an out-of-state financial
services institution that operated through the mail.168 At issue in J C.
Penney was Tennessee's assertion of taxing jurisdiction169 over the
165. See, e.g., John J. Cronin & Maryann B. Gall, Economic Nexus: A Case Study,
14 STATE TAx NoTEs 535, 537-39 (1998) (finding that nine states have "formally
adopt[ed] a Geoffrey analysis": Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, North Carolina, and Wisconsin).
166. See id at 539-40 (finding that seven states have "illustrated a reluctance to
enforce Geoffrey['s economic nexus doctrine]" via judicial decisions, administrative
determinations, or legislation: Alabama, Connecticut, Michigan, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Texas).
167. See J.C. Penney Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831, 839 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1999), cer't. denied, 531 U.S. 927 (2000) (applying Quill's physical presence requirement
to limit state income tax jurisdiction).
168. To be sure, pre-Quill versions of the physical presence nexus doctrine have been
used to prevent state taxation of out-of-state holding companies. See, e.g., Acme Royalty
Co. v. Dir, of Revenue, 96 S.W.3d 72, 75 (Mo. 1992) (finding a trademark licensing
agreement between a physically present corporation and its non-physically present
Delaware holding company to be an insufficient basis upon which to tax the income of the
holding company). Moreover, J.C. Penney is not the only judicial decision to explicitly
extend the holding in Quill to income tax jurisdiction. See, e.g., Rylander v. Bandag
Licensing Corp., 18 S.W.3d 296, 299 (Tex. App. 2000) ("Although written in the context
of sales and use taxes, Quill Corp. and Bellas Hess do not purport to apply a standard [to
businesses activity taxes] other than the "substantial nexus" test applied in Complete
Auto. . . ."); In re Wascana Energy Mktg., No. 817866, 2002 WL 1726832, at *17 n.6
(N.Y. Div. Tax App. July 18, 2002) (applying Quill's physical presence requirement to
limit state income tax jurisdiction). As the administrative law judge in Wascana reasoned:
The Quill opinion seems to suggest that the nexus standard as applied to the
duty to collect sales and use taxes may be different from the standard as it
applies to a tax measured by income. However, the holding in Quill explicitly
relies on and reaffirms the vitality of the substantial nexus requirement
expressed in Complete Auto, which is applicable to franchise and income
taxes.
Id.
169. Technically, the Tennessee fr-anchise tax at issue is not an income tax because it is
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Delaware-incorporated J.C. Penney National Bank (jCpNB).17 0 While
JCPNB had no physical presence in Tennessee, it engaged in credit card
solicitation activity through the mail with potential customers throughout
the United States, including Tennessee.'17 ' It maintained between 11,000
and 17,000 credit card accounts with Tennessee residents that generated an
undetermined but presumably substantial amount of revenue for JCPNB. 7
In addition, JCPNB engaged a Tennessee collection agency to pursue debt
collection efforts against its customers through the Tennessee court
system. 173
The Tennessee Court of Appeals found that due process did not bar
taxation of JCPNB 's Tennessee receipts, holding that "JCPNB has reached
out to the citizens of the State of Tennessee through the solicitations for
credit cards ... [and] purposefully availed itself of the substantial privilege
of doing business in the State of Tennessee. "'74 However, the court went on
to rule that Tennessee's assertion of taxing jurisdiction over JCPNB
violated the dormant Commerce Clause.17 5 Applying Quill, the court found
that JCPNB 's activities did not establish a substantial nexus because the
bank lacked a physical presence in the state.'17 6 As the court concluded:
Any constitutional distinctions between the franchise .. . taxes presented
here and the use taxes contemplated in. ...Quill are not within the
purview of this court to discern. As such, we feel that the outcome of
levied on apportionable gross receipts, rather than taxable income, but it nonetheless falls
within the broader category of business activity taxes with which this Note is concerned.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text (defining business activity taxes).
170. See JC Penney, 19 S.W.3d at 832 ("[JCPNB] was a federally chartered national
banking association incorporated under the laws of Delawre.... The present appeal arises
from ... [the Tennessee Commissioner of Revenue's] imposition of fr-anchise and excise
taxes against JCPNB on income allegedly generated by JCPNB's credit card activities in the
State of Tennessee.").
17 1. Id
172. Id.at840.
173. See id at 842 n.21 ("There is an indication in the record that one of JCPNB's
affiliates used a Tennessee collection agency in order to recover moneys owed to JCPNB.
Apparently, these collection efforts were aided through the use of the Tennessee court
system.").
174. Id. at 837.
175. See id at 839 ("While it is true that.. .. Qull... focused on use taxes, we find no
basis for concluding that the analysis should be different in the present case... for fr-anchise
taxes.").
176. See id. at 842 ("[Tlhe Commissioner has pointed to no case in which the Supreme
Court of the United States has upheld a state tax where the out-of-state taxpayer had
absolutely no physical presence in the taxing state.").
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this case is governed by Bellas Hess and Quill as those decisions
interpret the first prong of the Complete Auto test.'
C. Discussion
The Tennessee Court of Appeals was bound by Quill once it
determined (however questionably) that there was no relevant distinction to
be drawn between sales tax and income tax.'178 The broader policy question
for Congress is whether there should be a physical presence requirement for
income tax nexus. The answer must be no. It is clear that JCPNB engaged
in a substantial amount of commercial activity in Tennessee. 179 It would be
an odd policy indeed to exempt JCPNB from paying Tennessee franchise
tax on the receipts it derived from within Tennessee. Yet this is precisely
the result that a physical presence rule dictates, as JCPNB had no physical
presence in Tennessee.
The modem economic reality is that a physical presence is simply not
necessary for a business to operate within a particular state. A nexus
standard for state income taxation based on economic presence would
acknowledge this reality. It would permit states to require out-of-state
firms that do a significant amount of business within their borders to
shoulder an income tax burden similar to that of their physically present, instate competitors. As explained in Part V1, such an approach would greatly
increase the horizontal equity of the current state corporate income tax
system, ensuring that similar enterprises are taxed at similar levels
regardless of whether they have a physical presence within a market state.
V. State CorporateIncome Tax Reform: A Two-ProngedApp roach
A. A ProposedEconomic PresenceStandardfor Income Tax Nexus
Congress has failed to resolve the jurisdictional problems of the state
corporate income tax system, and its "temporary" solution, P.L. 86-272, is
now over fifty years old. The states, for their part, have failed to correct the
177. Id at 839.
178. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text (discussing important distinctions
between sales and use taxes and income taxes).
179. See supra notes 172-73 (noting that JCPNB cultivated tens of thousands of credit
card accounts with customers in Tennessee and contracted with a debt collection agency to
pursue legal action against its customers through the Tennessee court system).
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myriad of inconsistent apportionment methods that have inhibited the
efficient functioning of our national system of commerce for at least as
long. 8 0 Federal intervention is long overdue.
The proper solution is two-fold. First, Congress should "expand' 8'I
state income tax jurisdiction by adopting the economic nexus standard
proposed by the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC).18 2 Second, Congress
should require that states adhere to a uniform method of income
apportionment, such as the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes
Act (UDITPA).18'
The tandem effect of this proposal would be to
establish nexus certainty with a bright-line rule based on objective
criteria, as well as to greatly reduce the existing risk of both nowhere
income and multiple taxation by increasing uniformity in income
apportionment.'18
Such legislation would also ease compliance and
180. See infra note 205 and accompanying text (explaining that efforts to achieve
uniformity in income apportionment among the states date back at least to the drafting of the
Uniform Division of income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA) in 1957).
181. The term "expansion" should be qualified because some states have already
adopted an economic nexus standard. Supra note 165 and accompanying text. For these
states, such legislation would confirm, rather than expand, their income tax jurisdiction.
However, for the states that have "illustrated a reluctance to enforce Geoffrey['s economic
nexus doctrine]" via judicial decisions, administrative determinations, or legislative
direction, this proposal would constitute an expansion of taxing authority. Supra note 166
and accompanying text.
182. The MTC is "an intergovernmental state tax agency working on behalf of
states and taxpayers to administer, equitably and efficiently, tax laws that apply to multistate
and multinational enterprises." Multistate Tax Commission, About the Multistate Tax
Commission, http://www.mtc.gov/About.aspx?id=40 (last visited Feb. 23, 2010) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The economic nexus standard put forth by the
MTC was developed by Dr. Charles E. McLure, Jr., Senior Fellow with the Hoover
Institution at Stanford University. See generally Charles E. McLure, Jr., Implementing State
Corporate Income Taxes in the Digital Age, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 1287 (2000) (proposing a

"factor presence" standard for income tax nexus);

MULTISTATE TAX COMM'N,

supra note 18,

at n.7 (noting that McLure "originated the idea of factor presence nexus").

183.

UNIF.

Div. OF INCOME

FOR TAX PURPOSs

ACT

(1957). A voluntary, uniform act

for income apportionment, UDITPA was drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). Id. prefatory note. It is widely agreed
that UDITPA is in need of updating to account for changes in the national economy that
have occurred since its drafting in 1957. See, e.g., Benjamin F. Miller, Current Problems
with UDITPA and Possible Solutions, 38 STATE TAX NOTES 125, 125 (2005) ("UDITPA was
designed for a different and, almost assuredly, simpler economic and business
environment."). The proper adjustments are a subject of much debate among commentators
and somewhat beyond the scope of this Note.
184. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (noting that the risk of multiple taxation
is virtually eliminated if states employ a uniform method of apportionment); see also
Vickers, supranote 124, at 808 ("[lederal legislation. .. is the only solution [for producing
uniformity]. States have little incentive to adopt a uniform state income tax allocation and
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administrative burdens for businesses and states and reduce needless
litigation over nexus. Moreover, it would help ensure that multistate and
local businesses share similar income tax burdens in the states in which
they operate, and provide much-needed fiscal relief to states struggling
with dire budgetary shortfalls for years to come. Finally, such an
approach would reduce the attractiveness of certain tax shelters, thereby
freeing up finite business resources for use in efficient economic activity
rather than mere tax avoidance.
The economic nexus standard proposed by the MTC provides that a
substantial nexus is established when an out-of-state business entity
exceeds any of the following thresholds in a state:
(a) a dollar amount of $50,000 of property; or
(b) a dollar amount of $50,000 of payroll; or
(c) a dollar amount of $500,000 of sales; or
85
(d) 25% of total property, total payroll or total Sales.'
The MTC's economic nexus standard effectively eliminates the outof-state holding company as a tax shelter by broadly defining "sales" to
include: "The sale, lease or license of services, intangibles, and digital
products for primary use by a purchaser known to the seller to be in ...
[the market] State."186 Thus, if an out-of-state holding company derives
more than $500,000 in royalties from the licensing of its intangible
property-such as trademarked brand names-to its physically present,
in-state affiliate, then both entities would be subject to taxation by the
market state on an apportioned share of their income. Additionally, if an
out-of-state firm generates gross receipts of more than $500,000 in a
market state-through credit card lending, for example-then it would
apportionment statte .... Without the federal government overriding state sovereignty the
states will never achieve uniformity in the apportionment arena." (statement of Stephen
Kranz)).

185.

MULTISTATE TAx COMM'N,

supra note 18, at D-1. The threshold amounts would

be indexed for inflation. Id. Furthermore, the specific thresholds could just as easily be
fixed at different reasonable amounts; the crucial benefit is that they provide bright-line rules

based on objective criteria. See MICHAEL MAZEROV, CmR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
FEDERAL "BUSINESS AcTivrry TAX NEXUS" LEGISLATION: HALF OF A TWO-PRONGED
STRATEGY To GUT STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAXES 3 (2005), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/1-26-05sfprpdf ("Congress could implement a proposed model nexus
threshold carefully crafted by the Multistate Tax Commission, which would base the
existence of... [income tax] nexus on relatively objective measures of the amount of a
corporation's property, payroll, or sales present in a state.").

186.

MULTISTATE TAX COMM'N, supra note

18, at D-2 (emphasis added).
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also be subject to taxation by the market state on an apportioned share of its
income. And because sales are also defined to include the sale, "lease[,] or
license of tangible personal property"18 7 in a state, congressional adoption
of the MTC's economic nexus standard would effectively repeal P.L. 86272.
It is important to note that the MTC's proposed economic nexus
standard does not require any state to tax any source of income. This
preserves the sovereign power of the states to set their own fiscal policies
and compete for economic development with other states by providing
favorable climates in which to do business, which might include offering
incentives such as decreased nominal tax rates or increased deductions,
exemptions, and credits.188 Delaware and Michigan, for example, could
continue not to tax royalty or interest income of certain entities;' 89 Nevada
could continue not to impose any corporate income tax at all.' 90 The
MTC's economic nexus standard would simply ensure that any state that
wishes to exercise its legitimate right to tax an apportioned share of the
income generated within its borders is free to do so. It would also ensure
that whatever "tax competition" does occur between states takes place
within a coherent national framework with clear and predictable ground
rules-thereby greatly reducing the inequities and inefficiencies that result
when states compete haphazardly in the anarchic state corporate income tax
environment that exists today. To borrow a concept from economics, a
blanket nexus standard based on economic presence would provide the
necessary "market regulation" that would allow tax competition among the
states to flourish in a properly functioning "market" for favorable business
environments, in which states are the "producers" and multistate businesses
the ''consumers."

187. Id. (emphasis added).
188. Of course, rather than focusing myopically on tax considerations, states might also
consider their competitiveness with regard to other factors that affect firm investment
decisions, such as 'the quality of public services, the availability of an adequately-trained
labor force, and the cost of energy." MAzERov, supra note 35, at 39. Indeed, "a large body
of research suggest[s] that a state's business tax structure-including the design of specific
taxes and the aggregate tax burden-has at most a small impact" on a state' s economic
development objectives. Id
189. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (noting that Delaware and Michigan do
not tax certain royalty income).

190.

See

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,

not impose a corporate income tax).

supra note 21, at 2 (listing states that do
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B. Imposing Uniformity: An Updated UDITPA

Congressional blessing of an economic nexus standard for income tax
jurisdiction, while critical, cannot by itself provide for an effective reform
of the state corporate tax system. If the economic nexus solution is to
function properly, Congress must also require states to follow uniform rules
for income apportionment. Otherwise, the nowhere income problem will
not be resolved,' 9' the potential reduction in compliance and administrative
burdens will not be achieved,19 2 and the risk of multiple taxation of
93
multistate businesses will not be eliminated. 1
The question of precisely what that uniform method of apportionment
should be, however, is somewhat beyond the scope of this Note, and not
necessarily crucial to its thesis. 94 Indeed, divining the ideal uniform
apportionment formula is a task worthy of its own separate inquiry.' 95 For
the purpose at hand, it suffices to identify the approaches taken in two
previous uniformity-driven reform efforts, and to offer some observations
on how they might be improved upon for a third go-round.
The most ambitious reform effort culminated in 1965 with a report
issued by a special House subcommittee appointed to study state taxation of
interstate commerce.19 6 The Willis Report, as it is known, represents the
high-water mark of federal attempts to establish a uniform system of
income apportionment.9's
It recommended a uniform two-factor
191.

See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing the 'gaps and overlaps"

inherent to a nonuniform system of income apportionment); supra notes 45-53 and
accompanying text (discussing the problematic shift to sales-only apportionment).
192. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (listing six basic types of apportionment
formulas employed by states).
193. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (describing the need for uniformity in
order to ensure accurate income taxation of multistate businesses by the states).
194. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Legislative, Judicial, Soft Law and Cooperative
Approaches to Harmonizing Corporate income, 14 CoLUM. J. EuR. L. 377, 394 (2008)
("Within limits, uniform application of the same formula by all states is probably more
important than the particular formula chosen."). "Thus all states should use the same
formula (or the same sector-specific formulas) and all corporations (or at least all
corporations in a given sector of the economy) should use the same formula. . . ." Id.
195. See generally Charles E. McLure, Jr., A Comprehensive and Sensible UDITPA, 37
STATE, TA~x Noms 929 (2005) (proposing a redraft of several UDITPA provisions); Miller,
supra note 183 (identify'ing several problematic aspects of UDITPA).
196. H.R. REP. No. 89-952 (1965).
197. See Michael T. Fatale, Geoffrey Sidesteps Quill: ConstitutionalNexus, Intangible
Property, and the State Taxation of Income, 23 HOFsTRA L. Rnv. 407, 452 n.262 (1994)
("Since the enactment of Public Law 86-272 [in 1959], Congress has enacted only minor
legislation with any effect upon state corporate taxation.").
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apportionment formula based on the amount of property and payroll in each
state,19 8 as well as a blanket nexus standard that limited income tax
jurisdiction to states in which a business had either real property or
payroll.' 99 The Willis Report recommendations were never enacted,
however. 2
Conceptually, this Note shares the same basic approach as the Willis
Report. Both proposals call for Congress to establish a national standard
for state income tax nexus and a uniform method of income apportionment.
However, this Note contends that the nature of commerce today allows
firms to do a substantial amount of business in a given state without having
any real property or payroll there-i.e., without establishing a physical
201
presence.
It is therefore necessary to update the Willis Report
recommendations to account for this reality. This could be achieved by
adding a sales factor to both its blanket nexus standard and its uniform
apportionment formula. The result would be the two-pronged approach
advocated by this Note.
The second maj or uniformity effort is UDITPA, 0 a multilateral state
initiative that contrasts with the top-down federal approach of the Willis
Report. This voluntary, uniform act for income apportionment was drafted
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) in 1957 and later "adopted 203 by roughly half of the stateS20' as
198. H.R. REP. No. 89-952, at 1144-50.
199. Id at 1155-58. The income tax nexus standard proposed by the Willis Report was
effectively a physical presence requirement, as the ownership of real property or the
maintenance of payroll in a state necessarily creates a physical presence there.
200. See McLure, supra note 194, at 427 ("[Plarticular states feared the revenue
consequences of several features [of the Willis Report]. Market states objected to
elimination of the sales factor, and states that serve disproportionately as the commercial
domicile of corporations feared the loss of revenue from the taxation of non-business income
implicit in full apportionment.").
201. SupraPartlV.

202.
203.

UNIF.

See

Div. OF INCOME FOR TAx

PURPOSES ACT

(1957).

& HELLERSTEIN, supra note 35, 9.06 n.72 (stating that the
ostensible adoption of UDITPA by many states "should not be taken as implying the
formulas of all the States ...that have adopted UJDITPA ... are identical" but rather "the
statutes are studded with variations, including departures from the language of UDITPA as
promulgated"); Vickers, supra note 124, at 804 ("[Tlhe MTC claims today that over 40
states have 'adopted' UDITPA. This number is deceiving and is designed to ... [suggest]
that UDITPA is still widely adopted. In fact, only three states currently follow all of
UDITPA's core statutory principles; the rest have substantially modified the uniform
language.").
204. See McLure, supra note 194, at 433 ("About half of the states have adopted the
Compact [that incorporates UDITPA].").
HELLERSTEIN
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an effort to ward off federal imposition of uniformity in income
apportionment .2 05 This voluntary effort succeeded in warding off federal
intervention, but not in establishing uniformity, as states continued to
Recently, as an attempt to
deviate from UDITPA as they pleased .
address some outdated features of the act, the MTC requested that
NCCUSL update UDITPA to reflect the changed twenty-first century
208
207
More recently, however, this effort has lost steam , perhaps
economy.
illustrating the difficulty of a voluntary, state-by-state approach to
achieving uniformity in income apportionment.
Nevertheless, IJDITPA represents a natural starting point for the
For
establishment of a uniform method of income apportionment.20
example, UDITPA already provides for an equally weighted, three-factor
apportionment formula based on sales, property, and payroll to be applied
to all business income .2 10 This core principle is a sound one that should
be left undisturbed, as it seems to represent the best available metric for
approximating where the income-producing activity of a multistate
business occurs .2 11 For its part, this Note will merely suggest one
particular way in which UDIPTA should be adapted so as to complement
the blanket nexus standard proposed in Part V.A.

205.

UN1F.

Div. OF INCOME

FOR TAx PURPOSES ACT

prefatory note (1957); see also John

S. Warren, UDITPA-A Historical Perspective, 38 STATE TAx NOTES 133, 133 (2005)
("Then came the 1965 introduction [of federal legislation that would have imposed a
uniform method of apportionment] .... The states' response was a rush to adopt UDITPA
to show that they could solve the uniformity problem without congressional interference.').
206. Supra note 203 and accompanying text.
207. See Letter from Joan Wagnon, Chair, Multistate Tax Comm'n, and Joe
Huddleston, Executive Dir., Multistate Tax Comm'n, to Robert A. Stein, Esq., Chair,
Comm. on Scope and Program, Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws (Sept. 6,
2006) ("We believe model amendments or a complete rewrite are critical to preserving the
original uniformity goals of UDIPA. .. .") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
208. See John Buhl, ULC Committee Recommends Halting UDITPA Revision Study,
124 STATE TAX TODAY 1 (2009) ("A Uniform Law Commission (ULC) panel on June 30
passed a motion recommending that the group terminate its study of whether to revise the
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, with the option of restarting the effort
later.").
209. See Miller, supra note 183, at 125 ("For being almost 50, [UDITPA] has aged
fairly well, but like most of us in our middle age, it could be improved with the replacement
of some body parts.").
210. UNIF. Div. OF INCOME FOR TAX PuRposEs ACT § 9 (1957).
211. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing the superiority of threefactor apportionment as compared to sales-only apportionment).
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The primary shortcoming of UDITPA with which this Note is
concerned is the distinction it draws between business and nonbusiness
income. While business income-such as the profit derived from the sale
of a manufactured good-is apportioned according to a three-factor
apportionment formula, nonbusiness income-such as the types of royalty
and interest income described in Part [V.A-is not apportioned at all, but
instead allocated entirely to the state in which the corporation has its
commercial domicile. 1 This distinction prevents full apportionment of
all forms of corporate income. 1 While this may have been reasonable in
the mid-twentieth century, it makes little sense in today's national
economy,21 21
and
has contributed to the proliferation of tax planning
5
opportunities.
In combination with providing for a nationwide standard for income
tax nexus based on economic presence, as urged in Part V.A, Congress
should establish a uniform method of income apportionment by building on
the stalled UJDITPA reform efforts initiated by the MTC. Specifically,
Congress should either prescribe a formula itself, or mandate state adoption
of an updated UDITPA within a short period of time. If Congress must
dictate a formula, UDITPA's equally weighted, three-factor apportionment
formula would seem to be the optimal choice, provided it is coupled with
the elimination of the problematic distinction between business and
nonbusiness income. In the alternative, if history is any guide, the mere
threat of federal intervention may reinvigorate the UDITPA redrafting
effort and perhaps facilitate an agreement among the states regarding a
uniform method of income aporiomet
212. UNIF. Div. OF INCOME FOR TAx PuluosEs ACT §§ 4, 9 (1957); see also Walter
Hellerstein, The Business-NonbusinessIncome Distinction and the Casefor Its Abolition, 21
STATE TAx NOTEs 725, 725 (2001) ("Under UDITPA and similar statutes, all business
income is apportioned; all nonbusiness income is allocated.").
213. See Hellerstein, supra note 212, at 725 (describing how full apportionment of all
income requires the elimination of IJDITPA's distinction between business and nonbusiness
income).
214. See McLure, supra note 195, at 933 ("UDITPA's treatment of sales of intangible
property, promulgated when the U.S. economy was quite different, is unsatisfactoy....
Like sales of tangible products, sales of intangible products should be attributed to the state
of destination.").
215. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the use of out-of-state holding companies to
shelter income from state taxation).
216. See Vickers, supra note 124, at 808 ("[Tlhe original UDITPA sat idle for years
before being adopted by many states. The catalyst for this adoption was the recommendation
from a congressional committee that suggested federal legislation governing allocation and
apportionment." (statement of Stephen Kranz)). But as one commentator contends:
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VI. Evaluative Criteria: Equity, Efficiency, and Simplicity
There are three basic criteria used in tax policy evaluation:

efficiency, and simplicity. 2 17

equity,

These criteria can provide a helpful

framework for analysis of any proposed reform of the state corporate
income tax system. To reiterate, this Note proposes a two-pronged
approach: the establishment of an economic presence standard for income
tax nexus, coupled with the imposition of a uniform method of
apportionment upon the states. 1
This Part concludes that such an
approach would greatly increase the equity, efficiency, and simplicity of the
current system.
A. Equity
The first core tax principle, equity, includes two components-horizontal
and vertical equity. 21'9 Horizontal equity refers to what is "[p]erhaps the most
widely accepted principle of equity in taation ... that people in equal
positions should be treated equally., 220 To take a simple example, recall from
the hypothetical in Part HLIA that Company X generates $50 million in receipts
from the sale of tangible personal property in State C, but may not be taxed by
State C on the income generated by those sales because of the safe harbor of
P.L. 86-272. Now suppose that Company Y', a similar widget manufacturer that
is physically present in State C, also generates $50 million in sales there, and
therefore is taxed by State C on the income generated on those sales. At least
[flederal legislation ...is the only solution [for producing uniformity]. States
have little incentive to adopt a uniform state income tax allocation and
apportionment statte ....
Without the federal government overriding state
sovereignty the states will never achieve uniformity in the apportionment arena.
Id.
217. See. e.g., Swain. supra note 34, at 374 ("Questions of tax policy are generally
addressed with reference to three overarching values:
equity, efficiency, and
administrability [or simplicity].'); C. Eugene Steuerle, And (Equal) Tax Justice for All?, in
TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE

253, 255 (Joseph J. Thomdike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr.

eds., 2002) ("Equity's status as a political principle is unique, but it is not always the driving
force behind action.
Other objectives-efficiency, growth, simplicity-often take
precedence.").
218. Supra Part V.
219. See RICHARD MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY INPUBLIC
ECONOMY 160 (1959) (discussing horizontal and vertical equity). Vertical equity, which is
concerned with "how the taxation of people in different positions should differ," id., is of no
relevance to the taxation of corporations.
220. Id.
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with respect to the two businesses' operations in State C, P.L. 86-272 serves to
violate the principle of horizontal equity, as two similarly situated taxpayers
with the same ability to pay are treated quite differently for state income tax
purposes.22 The MTC's economic presence standard for income tax nexus
would reduce this horizontal inequity by requiring both Company X and
Company Y to bear a similar income tax burden in State C-regardless of
physical presence-because both companies generate the same amount of sales
there.
Current law also violates the principle of horizontal equity to the extent
that it permits the use of out-of-state holding companies as tax shelters. Thus,
the lack of a national standard for state income tax jurisdiction results in larger
multistate businesses being treated more favorably for tax purposes than their
smaller, local competitors . 222 While there is no de jure advantage-in theory,
the out-of-state holding company tax shelter is available to all businesses-in
practice, this option is available primarily to large-scale operations .22 3 This is
due in large part to several well-recognized judicial doctrines under the
common law of corporate taxation: 224 the sham transaction doctrine 22 1 the

economic substance doctrine,226 and the business purpose doctrine .22 ' The
22 1. It is true that physically present Company Y derives a greater degree of benefits
from State C than non-physically present Company X-presumably Company X does not
enjoy the same police and fire protection, infrastructure, and workforce education benefits
that Company Y enjoys by virtue of its physical presence. Nonetheless, this difference is
accounted for by the typical three-factor apportionment formula. That is, Company Y will
pay tax to State C on a greater share of its nationwide income than Company X because its
more extensive presence in State C is accounted for in the property and payroll factors.
These factors will be zero for Company X, thereby decreasing the percentage of its
nationwide income that is taxable by State C.
222. Supra note 23 and accompanying text.
223. Id.
224. These judicial doctrines have been defined in inexact and overlapping ways. See
STEPHEN A. LND~ ET AL., FuN IVIENTALs OF CORPORATE INCOME TAxATioN 10 (7th ed.
2008) ("[Such] judicial doctrines are imprecise.
The very vagueness of these
pronouncements, however, has contributed to their influence."). "Viewed most broadly,
the[se] judicial doctrines ask a simple question .... Have the taxpayers actually done what
they ... represent, or are the economic realities of the transaction-and the attendant tax
consequences--other than what the taxpayers purport them to be?" Id at 11.
225. See id. ("A sham transaction is best defined as a transaction that never actually
occurred but is represented by the taxpayer as having transpired-with favorable tax
consequences of course.").
226. See id. ("The. ...essence [of the economic substance doctrine] is that claimed tax
benefits should be denied if the transactions that give rise to them lack economic substance
apart from the tax considerations even if the purported activity actually occurred.").
227. See id. (describing how, under the business purpose doctrine, "[a] transaction
motivated by a business purpose is usually compared to one that has no substance, purpose,
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general thrust of these doctrines is to require a taxpayer to proffer some
legitimate business reason for its activity; if tax avoidance is the sole
motivation, the attendant tax benefits are denied, notwithstanding the letter
of the law.22 One state revenue director explains how these principles
operate in the context of tax shelters involving out-of-state holding
companies:
For example, a corporation cannot simply establish an affiliate in a lowtax state and assign all of its income to that affiliate; if that were to
happen, the original taxing state could disregard the second corporation
as a sham. Instead, there must be at least the appearance of a business
purpose for setting up that second corporation, and that appearance is
more available to larger corporations that will be able to segregate
various operations, for example, by having their trademarks put into
another entity and then licensed back to the original operating entities.
Mom-and-pop operations most likely don't have those options, and most
likely don't have the resources to pay 229
for the tax-planning services
necessary to develop and implement them.
The MTC's economic nexus standard would virtually eliminate out-of-state
holding companies as tax shelters because such entities would be subject to
taxation in their market states on the basis of the royalty income they derive
from leasing their trademarks to in-state affiliates. This would substantially
increase the equity of the current state corporate income tax system by tying
income tax jurisdiction not to physical presence, but to the amount of
revenue derived from a particular state.
B. Efficiency
The principle of tax efficiency, or tax neutrality, is premised on the
notion that tax policy should distort economic behavior as little as
possible .230
By their very nature, of course, taxes create market
or utility apart from tax avoidance"). "As originally formulated by Judge Learned Hand, the
business purpose doctrine was applied to deny tax-free status to a transaction that would not
have been consummated but for the tax savings that would result if its form were respected."
Id.; see also Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934) (explaining the
rationale for the business purpose doctrine).

228.

See

LIND ET AL.,

supra note 224, at 10-13 (describing the commnon law of

corporate taxation).
229. Bucks, supra note 22, at 3.
230. See Swain, supra note 34, at 375 ('[Tlhe goal of good tax policy is to minimize
the interference of a tax with the economic decisions that would be made in an otherwise
efficient market.").
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inefficiency. 23 'I The principle of tax efficiency merely suggests that this
distortion should be minimized as much as possible. Put another way, the
more that a tax system incentivizes business activity that would otherwise
never take place-activity for which the primary motivation is tax
avoidance-the more inefficient that tax system is. A perfect example of
business activity undertaken predominantly for tax purposes is the use of
out-of-state holding companies to shelter income from state taxation.
While large corporations may be able to proffer some legitimate business
purpose for incorporating a subsidiary in Delaware to hold its trademarksthereby withstanding scrutiny under the somewhat deferential common law
doctrines of corporate taxation 2 32-it is obvious that such action is driven
almost completely by tax considerations. 3
Admittedly, under our federal system of government, any state income
tax regime will incentivize such behavior to some degree. For example, as
long as states like Delaware or Michigan choose not to tax the interest or
royalty income of certain entities, 234 or states lk
lieNvada choose not to tax

income at

all, 235

corporations will always have incentives to incorporate or

move operations there for tax purposes. But the attractiveness of this
option-and the distorting effect it has on economic activity-can be
minimized by ensuring that the states from which businesses derive their
revenue have the opportunity to tax their fair share of the income generated
by the exploitation of their markets if they so choose. Federal adoption of
the MTC's economic nexus standard for income taxation, as proposed in
Part V.A, would ensure this result by permitting market states to tax any
entity whose sales within their borders exceed the $500,000 jurisdictional

23 1. See id ("Economists generally view taxes as necessarily distorting economic
behavior and resulting in economic inefficiencies.").
232. Supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., A&F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 189-90 (N.C. Ct. App.
2004) (describing a tax sheltering system involving nine Delaware holding companies that
possessed little economic substance). As the North Carolina Court of Appeals explained, the
out-of-state holding companies at issue in the case had "no employees and share office
space, equipment, and supplies; their listed primary office address is also the primary office
address of approximately 670 other companies unrelated to the [parent company] ... or its
wholly-owned subsidiaries." Id at 189-90. Despite not having any full-time employees,
these nine entities generated over $423 million per year from their affiliated, physically
present North Carolina retailers. Id. at 189. Similarly, in Geoffiey I, the Delaware holding
company owned by Toys R Us generated $55 million per year without a single full-time
employee. Supra note 158 and accompanying text.
234. Supra note 157 and accompanying text.

235.

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,

supra note 21, at 2.
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threshold. 3 This would increase the tax efficiency of the current system
because it would no longer be as worthwhile for businesses to devote
resources to elaborate tax sheltering schemes that have little, if any,
economic substance.
The efficiency, or neutrality, of the current state corporate income tax
system could also be increased by the imposition of a uniform method of
income apportionment, as proposed in Part V.13. As the Congressional
Research Service concludes, "[t]he critical issue with the current state
corporate income tax structure is the variability in the allocation and
apportionment of corporate income from state to state. The current mosaic
of state corporate income tax rules creates economic inefficiencies. ..
[because of the resulting] increased opportunities for tax planning by
businesses. 237 If all states used the same method of income apportionment,
the variability-and attendant inefficiency-of the current regime would be
greatly reduced. Again, the benefit of such reform would be to free up
resources for use in more efficient economic activity, as there would simply
be much less to be gained from structuring business operations based on
state tax concerns.
C. Simplicity

The third tax criterion, simplicity, stands for the proposition that the
tax system should be as simple as possible for all parties involved. 3 Tax
liability should be easy to calculate for the taxpayer and easy to administer
for the state. The current state corporate income tax system fails miserably
on this count. First and foremost, multistate businesses face uncertainty as
to whether they are subject to taxation in a particular state. 239 Even when
nexus is established so clearly as to eliminate the need for litigation under
the dormant Commerce Clause, businesses still confront significant
compliance burdens created by the variations in the manner states apportion
income for tax purposes. 4 States that impose an income tax face equally

236.

SupraPart V.A.

237.

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,

supra note 21, at 16.

238. See Swain, supra note 34, at 376 ("Adninistrability [or simplicity] is probably the
most easily understood tax policy value. A tax should be easy to administer and pay.").
239. Infra note 261 and accompanying text; supra Part IV.
240. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (listing six basic types of apportionment
formulas employed by states).
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daunting administrative burdens, as well as costly litigation for which its
taxpayers must ultimately foot the bill.
The lack of simplicity is partly due to the tension that exists between
equity and simplicity. Complicated provisions of state and federal tax law
are often the result of elaborate attempts to ensure that a "fair" result is
reached when a simpler rule might not guarantee such an outcome. 24' Too
often, tax policy must choose between simplicity and equity. On the one
hand, a simple, bright-line rule provides clarity and is easy to administer,
but may result in unjust outcomes when applied to particular situations. On
the other hand, an elaborate and complicated set of rules allows for
consideration of all sorts of special circumstances in due regard for equity,
but simplicity is sacrificed as a result. The state corporate income tax
system, however, presents somewhat of an anomaly to the general truism
that simplicity may only be increased at the expense of equity. Perhaps one
of the most compelling justifications for a blanket economic presence
standard for income tax nexus is that state income tax jurisdiction would
finally be delineated clearly by bright-line, objective criteria--dollar
thresholds in property, payroll, or sales within a state. Similarly, the
imposition of a uniform method of income apportionment would drastically
reduce compliance burdens for multistate businesses. Clearly, such reform
would do wonders from a simplicity standpoint. But as this Note has
demonstrated, these measures would also greatly increase the equity of the
current system by ensuring that out-of-state enterprises bear tax burdens in
market states that are similar to that of their in-state competitors. 4
VII. The UndesirableAlternative: BA TSA 's Physical Presence Standard
for Income Tax Nexus
A. ProposedLegislation

To provide a basis of comparison for the approach advocated by this
Note, it is helpful to analyze a competing proposal for federal reform in
light of the same criteria. The Business Activity Tax Simplification Act
241. Cf Swain, supra note 34, at 376-77 (discussing the "trade-off between equity and
simplicity"). "A complex set of rules is often required to accurately delimit a class of
similarly situated taxpayers or transactions. The Internal Revenue Code is replete with
examples of the complexity caused by trying to ensure that only the 'right' person or
transaction is taxed." Id.
242. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (explaining how certain state tax
shelters are effectively available only to larger, multistate businesses).
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(BATSA) 24 3 is useful in this regard as it represents the polar opposite of the
economic nexus standard for income taxation. However, as this Part will
demonstrate, BATSA would exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the inequity
and inefficiency that exists under the current state corporate income tax
system.
BATSA has been proposed, in various forms, in every Congress since
2003.'44 BATSA has three major thrusts, all of which overlap to some
extent. First, and most significantly, BATSA would establish a physical
presence standard for state income tax nexus. It provides that "[no] State
shall have the power to impose, assess, or collect a net income tax or other
business activity tax on any ... [business's] activities in interstate
commerce unless ... [it] has a physical presence in the State. 4 It goes on
to define physical presence narrowly so as to permit an out-of-state
business to use independent agents "to establish or maintain the market" in
a state without creating a substantial nexus for income tax purposes .2 46 An
independent agent is defined to include any entity that provides "business
services" to at least one other person or business in the state in the same
taxable yer
The effect of BATSA's physical presence requirement would be to
permit out-of-state businesses to engage in a substantial amount of
commercial activity within a market state without being subject to taxation
by that state on the resulting income .248 This could be achieved through a
variety of tax planning strategies. One specific example is illustrated by a
return to the hypothetical in Part III.A. Recall that Company X is
243. Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2009, H.R. 1083, 111Ith Cong. (2009).
244. Id.; H.R. 5267, 110th Cong. (2008); S. 1726, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1956,
109th Cong. (2006); H.R 1956, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3220, 108th Cong. (2003).
245. Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2009, H.R. 1083, 111Ith Cong. (2009).
246. Id.
247. Id. Mazerov suggests that this expansive definition of independent agent would
open up a sizable loophole for tax planning purposes. Specifically, an out-of-state business
could incorporate a subsidiary in a market state to engage in the commercial activity
necessary to do business in a state. See MICHAEL MAZEROV, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, CLOSING THREE COMMON CORPORATE INCOME TAx ]LOOPHOLES COULD RAISE
ADDITIONAL REVENUE FOR MANY STATES app. 6 (rev. 2008), available at http://
www.cbpp.org/6-24-08sfp-appendix.pdf (explaining the ramifications of BATSA's agency
provisions). As long as the in-state subsidiary provided business services to at least one
additional entity-including, even, another corporate affiliate-the out-of-state business
would not be taxable on the income it derives from effectively operating in the market state.
Id The in-state subsidiary, for its part, would only be taxable on the relatively minor
amount of income it received for its services. Id.
248. MAZEROV, supra note 247, at 1-3.
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incorporated in State A and thus taxable by State A on the apportioned share
of income derived from within its borders. Company X also maintains a
warehouse and payroll in State B and thus is taxable in State B for the
income derived from within its borders. BATSA would not change this.
Instead, BATSA would allow a competing widget manufacturer, Company
Z, to engage in similar commercial activity in State B without paying any
income tax to State B on those profits. 249 Under BATSA, Company Z could
simply use a third-party warehouse to hold its goods in State B for delivery
as needed. As long as that warehouse provided business services to at least
one additional entity in State B, it would qualify as an independent agent of
250
Company Z, thereby shielding Company Z from tax liability in State B.
In fact, Company Z could even operate its own warehouse in State B
through a corporate subsidiary, and as long the subsidiary provides business
services to at least one additional entity, then Company Z would still come
within BATSA's expanded safe harbors .25 '1 As discussed in Part VI,
treating similar taxpayers differently violates the tax principle of horizontal
equity. It also produces market distortion and inefficient, tax-driven
economic behavior, thereby violating the principle of tax efficiency or
neutrality. Unfortunately, BATSA would prevent states from treating
similar businesses similarly for income tax purposes,252 as it would
effectively repeal the economic nexus doctrine wherever it is currently
employed. 5
A second, somewhat overlapping provision of BATSA would extend
the safe harbors of P.L. 86-272 to include sales or transactions of intangible
property and services . 254 (Currently, P.L. 86-272 only applies to sales of
tangible personal property.) 255 This provision of BATSA would codify into
federal law certain state tax shelters that rely on intangible property

249. Supra note 247 and accompanying text.
250. Supra note 246 and accompanying text.
25 1. Supra note 246 and accompanying text. Of course, if State B required combined
reporting, this maneuver would produce no benefit for Company X
See Part ID
(discussing combined reporting).
252. See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text (discussing BATSA's physical
presence standard for income tax nexus).
253. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (identifying states that have adoptedas yet, without either the approval or rejection of the Supreme Court-an economic presence
standard to combat certain state tax shelters by subjecting out-of-state holding companies to
taxation based on the income derived from within the taxing state).
254. Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2009, H.R. 1083, 111Ith Cong. (2009).
255. 15 U.S.C. §381(a) (2006).
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transactions-such as the licensing of trademark rights in exchange for
256
royalties-between an out-of-state business and its in-state affiliate.
The third major component of BATSA would expand the range of
This
permissible solicitation activities protected under P.L. 86-272.
provision would allow businesses to engage in a more extensive degree of
commercial activity within a state without establishing a substantial
nexus. 2 17 Of course, because Congress did not define solicitation under
P.L. 86-272 to begin with,258 it is difficult to state precisely how BATSA
expands a non-existent definition .259 Nonetheless, to the extent that it
delineates specific activity not explicitly included in the current safe
harbors, BATSA would exacerbate the existing problems created by P.L.
86-272.26

B. Critique
BATSA proponents, in making their case for federal intervention,
emphasize the value of establishing a clear nexus standard so as to provide

256. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the out-of-state holding company tax shelter).
This provision of BATSA is somewhat duplicative of its physical presence standard for
income tax nexus, which arguably also codifies this corporate tax loophole. Supra notes
245-47 and accompanying text.
257. Currently, the safe harbor activities under P.L. 86-272 are limited to the
'solicitation" of orders within a market state that are filled and shipped from outside that
state. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a)(1). BATSA would expand permissible solicitation activities to
include:
[Tihe furnishing of information to customers or affiliates in ... [a] State, or the
coverage of events or other gathering of information in ... [a] State ... [if the]
information is disseminated from a point outside the State; and [all] those
business activities directly related to. ...[a business'] potential or actual
purchase of goods or services within the State if the final decision to purchase is
made outside the State ....
Business Activity Tax Simplification Act, H.R. 1083, 111lth Cong. (2009).
258. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (noting that Congress failed to define
"solicitation" when it enacted P.L. 86-272 in 1959, and that the lack of a clear definition
remains problematic to this day).
259. Mazerov has identified numerous concrete examples of how BATSA would
expand permissible solicitation activities under P.L. 86-272. See generally MAzEROV supra
note 247 (analyzing BATSA). Furthermore, it is not altogether clear to what extent
additional commercial activities BATSA would immunize from income taxation by a market
state-in practice, such immunization may turn out to be broader than anticipated.
260. See supra Part III.B.3 (explaining how P. L. 86-272 contributes to the nowhere
income problem).
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certainty to multistate businesses and reduce litigation in state courts over
nexus. As one trade group testified before Congress:
Conflicting state laws and court decisions create tremendous uncertainty
and expense for taxpayers .... The uncertainty created by conflicting
interpretations of the Constitutional standard for tax jurisdiction has
long resulted in unnecessary administrative and litigation expense for
both taxpayers and states, and will certainly increase the costs
and risks
26
of operating a multistate business in the foreseeable future. 1
Nexus certainty is best ensured, it is argued, by a physical presence
standard for state income taxation. 6 The claim is made that nonphysically
present businesses do not receive "meaningful benefits or protections" from
market state governments, and therefore should not be subject to income

taxation by them. 263

This Note is in agreement with BATSA proponents on the need for
federal intervention in the state corporate income tax arena. Providing
nexus certainty to multistate businesses, reducing compliance and
administrative burdens of state income taxation, and minimizing costly
litigation over nexus issues are all compelling justifications for federal
intervention. Indeed, such policy concerns strike at the very heart of the
constitutional prerogative-and duty--of Congress to properly "regulate
commerce ... among the several states." 264 But BATSA is not the
appropriate way to do so, for at least three reasons.
First, at the heart of the rationale for BATSA's physical presence
standard is the notion that out-of-state firms do not benefit from the services
provided by market state governments. This is simply not true. As
Geoffr-ey I illustrates, a physical presence standard for income nexus would
allow multistate firms to operate in a market state and enjoy all of the
governmental benefits associated with a physical presence-such as police
and fire protection, infrastructure, and a public school system that supplies
261. The Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2008: Hearing on H.R. 5267
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial andAdministrative Law of H Comm. on the Judiciary,
11I0th Cong. 121 (2008) (statement of Council on State Taxation (COST)).
262. See id. at 122 ("Congress must recognize physical presence as the jurisdictional
standard for business activity taxes.").
263. See id. ("Determinations of jurisdiction to tax should be guided by one
fundamental principle: a government has the right to impose burdens. .. only on businesses
that receive meaningful benefits or protections from that government."). "[B]usinesses that
are not physically present in a jurisdiction and are therefore not receiving meaningful
benefits or protections from the jurisdiction should not be required to pay tax to that
jurisdiction." Id.
264. U.S. CoNST. art. 1 § 8, cI. 3.
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a competent local workforce-while funneling the resulting income out to
non-physically present holding companies .265 A physical presence standard
for income tax nexus permits these businesses to "free-ride" on the tax
burden borne disproportionately by the remaining taxpayers that cannot
take advantage of such state tax sheltering opportunities. Moreover, even
firms that truly lack a physical presence in a state still enjoy significant
governmental benefits by doing business there. In addition to furnishing a

market for such firms to exp loit,266 states also maintain court systems that
allow firms to enforce the legal obligations of their customers and business
partners in the area. 267 The justification for BATSA thus cannot stand on a
benefits-received analysis.
Second, BATSA would significantly increase the inequity and
inefficiency of the present state corporate income tax system. It would
exacerbate the current inequity of P.L. 86-272 by extending its safe harbors
to transactions of intangible property and services. It would deal an
additional blow to equity by effectively repealing the economic nexus
doctrine that some states have adopted in an attempt to treat economically
similar taxpayers similarly regardless of physical presence. 6
Tax
efficiency would fare no better, as BATSA's proposed physical presence
standard would engender a new era of purely tax-motivated business
activity designed to take advantage of the plethora of tax planning
opportunities created by a jurisdictional standard that elevates form over
substance. Such an approach ignores the modern economic reality that
physical presence is no longer necessary to do business in a particular state.
The third problem with BATSA is that it would impose enormous
costs on state governments in the form of additional lost corporate income
tax revenue.26 Estimates predict that BATSA would cost states anywhere
265. See supra Part IV.A (describing how out-of-state holding companies are used as
state tax shelters).
266. Swain, supra note 34, at 378 n.331 ("Taxes are what we pay to live in a society
that allows a market to operate in the first instance. Like it or not, the government is a
,silent partner' in the economy ... that often is not appreciated until it ceases to
function. ... )
267. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (noting that non-physically present
JCPNB engaged a debt collection agency to pursue debt collection efforts through the court
system of the market state); supra note 35 and accompanying text (describing the benefits
out-of-state businesses derive from market state governments).
268. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (listing states that have adopted an
economic presence standard for income tax nexus).
269. These costs would be in addition to the substantial revenue losses that result from
nowhere income under the current system. Supra Part 11.
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from $3 billion to $8 billion per year in lost tax revenue once multistate
businesses have fully conformed their operations to take advantage of the
additional tax planning opportunities created by the bill .270 The states,
already in poor fiscal health that is expected to continue for years to come,
cannot bear such a blow.
VIII. Conclusion
Only Congress has the power to resolve the jurisdictional uncertainty
and multifarious methods of income apportionment that plague state
corporate income taxation. Its failure to intervene in this area inhibits the
efficient functioning of our national system of comnmerce and hamstrings
state attempts to craft sound tax policy. However, the wrong kind of federal
intervention-such as BATSA's physical presence standard for income tax
nexus-would only exacerbate these problems. The proper course of action
for Congress is the two-pronged solution proposed by this Note: The
establishment of a nationwide standard for income tax nexus based on
economic presence, coupled with a uniform method of income
apportionent.

270. See Bucks, supra note 22, at 3, 9 (citing estimates by the Congressional Budget
Office and the National Governors Association).

